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CREDITS

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Welcome to the fifth edition of Agora! This collection of UWE Bristol Philosophy papers is published every few years, depending on the current committee. We have been through a lot over these past couple academic years, from campaigning to keep the undergraduate philosophy course running, to the ongoing pandemic and the move online. I would like to say thank you to all the students involved in the campaign, UWE philosophy department staff, and the wider academic community for all of your support in ensuring the program remained open. Furthermore, to all the UWE Philosophy lecturers and PHD staff for the support they have provided during these strange times. Their influence on these papers is evident. Our front design is inspired by the wonderful Iain Grant and his (and our other academics) views on nature. We have a great variety of papers in this journal, all written by undergraduates. You can read them in any order you wish. We, the committee, are proud to be part of the UWE Philosophy family and share these papers with you.

Evan Botwood
President of the Philosophy Society 2020/21

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KIERKEGAARD

FEAR AND TREMBLING AND CRIME AND PUNISHMENT; A CHARACTER COMPARISON

Compare the literary characters of Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling, with those of Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment.

Evan Botwood

I will compare the characters of Fear and Trembling[1] and Crime and Punishment [1], adding to a tradition of comparing these authors[2]. This essay will comprise of an examination of the 'Knight of Faith', followed by its comparison to the protagonist of Dostoyevsky's text, Raskolnikov, and its actual heroine Sonia. My examination will firstly reconstruct the concept of 'double movement of faith' as the Knight of Faith's essential trait. I will then argue for three characteristic markers that are entailed by this: incommunicability, hope, and loss. These markers will act as points of comparison, for my subsequent comparison to Raskolnikov, and then Sonia. I argue that Raskolnikov is not the Knight of Faith, but performs a moment of misunderstanding through misused reason. I finally argue that Sonia is an exemplar case of the Knight of Faith. This comparison acts to compare the two authors' philosophic thought, revealing the compatibility of two early existential thinkers.

De Silentio is the self-proclaimed poet to his hero Abraham (FT, pp. 15-17)[1], that being the one who can "admire, love, take pleasure in the hero" (FT, p.15), and tells proudly of the hero's achievements (FT, p.16). Abraham is a hero for De Silentio because of his faith, which is repeatedly praised by De Silentio (FT, pp. 15-26). Abraham is a perfect example of the Knight of Faith. In outward appearance, the Knight of Faith is an unsurprising, care-free, and hopeful person who makes the most of every moment (FT, pp. 45-47). Internally he performs what De Silentio describes as the "double movement" (FT, p.41) of faith which I will now move onto.

The double movement is an inward, personal change of an individual (a 'movement'). There are two movements that the Knight of Faith performs which are essential to him. One does not remain stable in this place, but must constantly perform these movements (FT, p.48). The first movement is that of infinite resignation where one, with great concentration of will, takes a passionate leap into renouncing the world and whatever you value in it (FT, p.48-50). One must perform this movement to get to faith (FT, p.56). It is a letting go of the finite (the world and its entities) to embrace the infinite, without merely moving onto some other finitude. I'll explain this in the same manner as De Silentio, by using the example of a lad and his princess (FT, pp. 49-54). A lad is in love with a princess, and this is his life's sole desire, but the relationship can never happen. He does not reject this love but goes through a process towards infinite resignation (FT, p.50). He fully realises the impossibility of the situation and is then able to make the movement. His love is transformed from an earthly love of the princess, one of the finite world, to that of an "eternal being" (FT, p.52) which grants that his love is forever valid. This movement acts as protection from the finite world. The princess marrying a prince would not cause him suffering, nor would he even pay attention to what she does anymore. Though he has resigned the fact that he will never receive the love of the princess in the finite world, he holds onto it in the infinite, and as such it is "the shirt sewn in tears, but then it also gives better protection than iron or steel" (FT, p.55). It is a peaceful place but removed from the finite world. I will now reconstruct the second movement.

The second movement consists of grasping back the finitude that has been resigned. To continue the above example, the movement the Knight of Faith would enact in the situation would be expressed by saying, "I nevertheless believe I will get her, namely on the strength of the absurd, on the strength of the fact that for

God all things are possible" (FT, p.56). The Knight of Faith has entirely realised that this love is an impossibility, but he believes it regardless. How does he do this? Not by relying on his thought and understanding (which would conclude that it is impossible), but by the absurd, which is believed through faith (FT, p.57). It is not merely that he deceives himself; The Knight of Faith knows that it is an impossibility "with all the passion of his soul and with all his heart" (FT, p.57), but that he accepts the absurd, opposing belief regardless. That is, he believes not on the strength of his own understanding, but on the strength of the absurd. Having reconstructed the double movement of faith I will now engage with literature to argue for three distinctive markers (or characteristics) of the Knight of Faith, which are entailed by the double movement. These markers will be applied to Raskolnikov and then Sonia.

The first marker is the incommunicability of the movement of faith, because of its incommensurability. The movement of faith is taken on the absurd, not on our thought and understanding, therefore it cannot be understood, at least not by someone who does not perform this movement. To reinforce this point, I refer to De Silentio's own remarks. At multiple points De Silentio argues that the Knight of Faith's movement is incommensurable (thus it can't be communicated). In Problema II (FT, pp. 100, 104), because Abraham suspends the commensurable ethical domain, and in Problema III (FT, pp. 107, 160), stating explicitly "But none could understand Abraham" (FT, p.160). We can be sure then that not being able to be communicated holds as a marker of the Knight of Faith. The second marker, following Lippitt (2015), is hope, which is expecting the possibility of good. Lippitt (2015, p.129) describes Kierkegaard's concept of hope as expecting victory, holding fast against doubt, and not a weaker wishing that something were the case. Crucially, this is not out of naivety, nor a happy middle ground between naïve hope and absence of hope given an experience of life as a mix of good and bad (Lippitt, pp. 125-6). The Knight of Faith expects that he will be reunited with the princess, unlike the lad, though he knows its impossibility. Furthermore, this is demonstrated when the Knight of Faith has hope that his wife has laid a delicious meal for him, though he is fully aware of his own poverty (FT, p.47). I have argued for my first two characteristic markers of the Knight of Faith (incommunicability and hope) and will now move onto the final marker, loss.

The double movement of faith, and so the Knight of Faith, has loss at its heart. I follow Krishek (2015) on this. This is clear in the case of the lad. His loss is the loss of the potential relationship with the princess. With Abraham, the loss was his son, future generations, or perhaps the loss of love for his son or God. Either way, loss is central to his predicament. What about the Knight of Faith? It is less obvious how loss is involved with his story, as he doesn't appear to lose anything (except his delicious meal). We find the answer when De Silentio states that the Knight of Faith is "at every moment making the movement of infinity. He drains in infinite resignation the deep sorrow of existence… he has felt the pain of renouncing everything" (FT, p.48). Following Krishek (2015, pp. 114-116), there is no actual loss as such (as with the lad), but there is an essential loss entailed in existing temporally. Existing within time, we are always losing our past, (no second can never be taken back) always have a potential loss of things in future (our health, loved ones), and will have a final loss (death). Unlike most people, the Knight of faith fully recognises these painful truths, and so his resignation and loss is of finitude (with its temporality). Therefore, loss is a marker of the Knight of Faith.

I will now apply these three markers to Raskolnikov, the primary protagonist of Crime and Punishment, which direct us towards how he fits regarding the double movement of faith. I start with how Raskolnikov's murder is communicable, which leads to how he does not have loss as the Knight of Faith does. Raskolnikov's most significant action is his murder of a moneylender and her sister, around which the whole book revolves. Could Raskolnikov's inner motivation and reasoning for this murder be communicated? Before the murder occurs, Raskolnikov does not reveal his plan to anyone, rehearsing it alone (CP, pp. 4-7), and finding the perfect time alone (CP, p.50). He even only refers to the planned murder indirectly as "that" (CP, p.41). However, there being a

plan entails that this plan could be communicated (and is to the reader). What about the justification then? This justification is that to commit this murder is not a crime; The narrator writes he has "no intention of rehearsing the arguments that led to that conclusion" (CP, p.58). These arguments can be rehearsed, and being arguments, can be understood. Therefore, even the justification can be understood, and within an ethical framework. Raskolnikov's deeper justification is found later in the text, in an article that Raskolnikov has written. His original position is that 'great men' such as Napoleon have the "moral right to shed blood" (CP, p.197), with the suggestion that he is one of these great men (CP, p.199), hence why he can justify murder. Raskolnikov's paper is, therefore, proof that his murderous act can be communicated, because insofar as its justification can be placed into a form of communication and discussed (CP, pp. 192-199), it can be communicated. Furthermore, this demonstrates that to kill these women was no loss to him, given he is one of these 'great men', but merely a moral duty. He even gained financially from it, stealing her goods (CP, p.64). Evans (2015, pp. 62-3) notes De Silentio's rejection that Abraham (hence Knight of Faith) can be justified in his murder by being a great man, reinforcing this point. I have shown that Raskolnikov is unlike the Knight of Faith when it comes to incommunicability and loss. I will now show the same for hope.

Raskolnikov does not hope how the Knight of Faith hopes. He shows a compassionate, seemingly hopeful, side throughout the book but this always falls back to renouncing the world. This is demonstrated when he saves a tricked drunk girl from potential assault, leaving her in the care of a police officer and providing funds for her return home (CP, pp. 38-40). However, immediately after he shouts to the officer, "Let him amuse himself' (pointing to the man). 'What can it matter to you?'" (CP, p.40) and shows disdain that he intervened (CP, p.41). Raskolnikov, questioning why the officer should bother intervening, shows that he has no grasp on the finite world, and as such, has no hope for it. The girl does not matter to him. He even then assumes that the potential assaulter will just bribe the officer anyway. This clearly demonstrates his lack of hope, as the Knight of Faith has it. I will now show how this fits in with the double movement of faith, and where we can place Raskolnikov in it.

I claim that Raskolnikov has not fully enacted either movement of the double movement of faith because he is split, and as such performs a movement of misunderstanding. Vaškovic (2020, p.85) argues that Raskolnikov is a prime example of Dostoyevsky's fragmentary view of the self; Raskolnikov's name is derived from the word raskol meaning split or schism, which depicts his split between his own moral conscience, and his idea that he is a superior 'great man'. Given this, Raskolnikov has not entirely resigned (nor rejected) finitude and the world, nor therefore has he grasped finitude back in faith. Where does he fit then? After discussing the movement of infinite resignation, De Silentio states "I could easily fill a whole book with the various misunderstandings, awkward positions, and slovenly movements I have encountered" (FT, p.55). Here we see that there are other movements, which are subpar and scattered compared to the movement of infinite resignation. To make this movement takes a concentration of will, which Raskolnikov lacks due to his split. As such, his movement is one of misunderstanding instead. The misunderstanding is his misuse of reason (in his article and internally) to put himself above the finite world in his superiority, and as such act as he sees ethically fit, including harming the finite 'lower' humans. This is starkly contrasted by the Knight of Faith's own split, which though firmly concentrated, comprises two movements together. The first is wholly resigning the finite, the second taking it back and all humanity with it. I have shown that Raskolnikov has not fully enacted either movement of the double movement of faith, because he is split in this manner, and as such performs a movement of misunderstanding. Furthermore, I have shown that both characters are similar in that they hold two aspects in tension within themselves. I have applied the three markers to Raskolnikov, which has shown his contrast to the Knight of Faith.

I will now apply the markers to Sophia (Sonia) Semenovna and argue that she becomes a Knight of Faith.

Sonia's loss is her voluntarily giving up her chastity, in the service of her step-mother and step-siblings, as noted by Blake (2006). She, just like Raskolnikov, goes beyond a (Christian) ethical rule in order to act in accordance to a higher just cause, that is, protecting the people close to her from sexual predators and starvation (Blake, 2006, pp. 252-3). This loss comes with an extreme reduction of social standing and a deep shame (CP, p.174). Even so, she does not assume the identity of a victim of male seduction (as with the drunk girl above), even rejecting a man, for she has a weaker kind of hope (Blake, 2006, p.258). Sonia's initial weaker hope is that she will be redeemed, and justice prevail by God's direct intervention, meaning that all she needs to do is submit to those around her (especially the men) and wait (Blake, 2006, pp. 265-6). She goes through an redemptive arc of this hope being brought down (a test of faith), but emerging as a character who applies her faith to actual situations, acting in authority and far from submissive; she knows now that higher justice will not materialise unless she acts (Blake, 2006, p.266) and now she truly hopes. Sonia has made the double movement of faith. The first movement is leaving her hopeless situation in the hands of the eternal (God), resigning this self-sacrificing life with its shame over to the eternal 'till it intervenes'. The second movement is her grasping back hold of the finite, of her own life; knowing that her situation is hopeless but paradoxically having faithful hope regardless of the strength of the absurd. We have seen two of the markers (loss, hope) and the third appears when Raskolnikov confesses his crime to Sonia. He attempts in many ways to justify himself by reason, but she powerfully rejects all of them, but not by ethical argument. This also demonstrates how she has made the second movement, beyond the ethical. She has become the Knight of Faith. Sonia shows all the markers of the Knight of Faith, and most crucially of all, she makes the double movement of faith. Furthermore, from this place she manages to set Raskolnikov towards redemption (CP, pp. 433-434) through her practical action and love. As such, she embodies the Knight of Faith as a real character lived through time.

To conclude, I have argued for a reading of the double movement of faith, and for three characteristic markers of the Knight of Faith: incommunicability, hope, and loss. I applied these to Raskolnikov, arguing that his murder can be communicated (via his article), that he does not suffer significant loss, and he has no hope for the finite world. I argued then that Raskolnikov is instead performing a movement of misunderstanding, due to his inner split, and misusing reason. This also showed the similarity of internal dialectical tension. Finally, I argued that Sonia follows the journey of the Knight of Faith, and as such embodies it. Through my comparison of character, I have compared the philosophic thought of these two authors, therefore I finally conclude that there is compatible thinking between these two early existential thinkers' texts, namely on the concept of 'double movement' and the traits of the faithful individual.

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NOTES

[1] For brevity all citations of format (FT, page number) refer to Kierkegaard (2014). Citations of format (CP, page number) refer to Dostoyevsky (1998).

[2] See Vaškovic (2020, p.82) for a list of commentators.

ABRAHAM, DEVIL OR ANGEL?

Compare and contrast Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith and the Devilish character.

Ella Vennik

Fear and Trembling analyses the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac and uses it to outline Kierkegaard's philosophy of faith. In this essay, I will be comparing Abraham as the Knight of Faith with the devilish characters of Faust and the Merman that are highlighted by Kierkegaard in Problema III of Fear and Trembling. With this comparison, I am hoping to highlight Kierkegaard's underlying argument that religion should be valued over the ethical. The arguments that Kierkegaard makes in Problema III lend themselves as being a critique of Kantian ethics and it is this critique that I will be focusing on in this essay. I will be arguing that the Knight of Faith is ultimately not a devilish character because he is in the religious sphere, whereas the devilish characters of Faust and the Merman are bound by their evil doing. However, I will also be highlighting some ways in which the characters are similar. Mainly that both the actions of Abraham and the actions of the devilish characters are incomprehensible. The main aim of this essay is to show how the Knight of Faith, a character of religion, is above the devilish character and thus to highlight why Kierkegaard is writing in arguing that the religious sphere should be considered above the ethical.

To begin, I will briefly outline the story of Abraham and Isaac in which Kierkegaard defines Abraham as the Knight of Faith. I will also briefly explain why this version of the Abraham story produces the Knight of Faith rather than, in contrast, the Knight of Infinite Resignation. The story begins with Abraham, who has been told by God that he is his chosen one and will become the father of nations (Kierkegaard 2005, p17). However, he and his wife, Sarah have been unable to have children into their old age. Despite this, Abraham has faith that God will give him a child. Kierkegaard describes that Abraham believed, and therefore he was young (2005, p18). He claims that because Abraham had faith in God's plan for him, he was able to have eternal youth. By the story, Abraham is rewarded for his faith when Sarah delivers their son, Isaac and it seems that God's plan has been fulfilled. Yet, God tests Abraham again. He instructs Abraham that he must take Isaac up the mountain and kill him as an offering (Kierkegaard 2005, p19). Without telling Sarah or Isaac what his fate was to be, Abraham led Isaac up the mountain with the intention to do as God asked. He had faith in God that he must kill Isaac but also that he would be returned to him (2005, p20). However, just as Abraham was about to do the deed, God provided a ram as an offering instead, and Isaac was saved. It is important to explain why this version of Abraham is the Knight of Faith. The answer can be found within the name itself. This version of Abraham has utter faith in God. Kierkegaard describes that by loving God, as the greatest possible being, Abraham becomes greater himself (2005, p15). He becomes the perfect example of faith. Abraham believes the impossible; that he will be reunited with Isaac if he kills him. Not just in the afterlife, but in this life (Kierkegaard 2005 p20). He has faith in God's plan and that God will reward him in this life by bringing Isaac back to him. This is why Kierkegaard believes this Abraham to be the knight of faith, because he does not doubt God. Instead he believes by virtue of the absurd.

The devilish character can be found in Problema III of Fear and Trembling. In this chapter, Kierkegaard looks at whether it was ethical for Abraham to withhold his actions from Sarah and Isaac (2005, p98). In this Problema, Kierkegaard is partially concerned with trying to work out how moral evil is possible. Kierkegaard regards the distinction between good and evil as dependent on God (McDonald 2021). Something is evil if it goes against God. In order to tackle the question of whether moral evil is possible, Kierkegaard gives several examples of devilish characters as a comparison to Abraham as the knight of faith. I will be focusing on the two characters of the Merman and Faust. I would argue that both these characters represent evil and devilishness in some way. Kierkegaard tells the story of the Merman and Agnete as an example of a being controlled by their monstrousness. The Merman is a seducer that rises up from the sea and coaxes women to their demise by charming them under false pretences (Kierkegaard 2005, p114). The Merman attempts this with Agnete, he is overcome by her innocence, falls in love with her, and so feels he must let her go (Kierkegaard 2005, p115). The Merman's devilishness means he can never have Agnete in the sense that he belongs to her, he is only capable of monstrous acts. Originally a character in German folklore, Faust is a man who is wholly unsatisfied with his life, and so makes a deal with the devil for all knowledge and all worldly pleasures. Kierkegaard retells the story of Faust and turns him into the ultimate doubter that succumbs to the way of the flesh (2005, pp131-132). For Kierkegaard, Faust is obsessed with having ultimate knowledge. This is what makes Faust demonic. He is prepared to make a deal with the devil for selfish gain. For Kierkegaard, doubt is the complete opposite to faith (Lippett 2003). Thus, by showing Faust as the supreme doubter, shows him to be at complete opposites to godliness, and thus must be devilish. At first, it might seem obvious that these characters have nothing in common with the Abraham who is supposedly a pillar of faith. However, in the following paragraph I would like to argue that there are some striking similarities between the characters.

To understand why the devilish character and the knight of faith are similar, I want to first introduce Kant's ethical system as a theory that Kierkegaard addresses in Problema III of Fear and Trembling. Kant argues that the question that should be asked when considering ethics is "what ought I do?" (Johnson and Cureton 2021). The answer to this, he believes, is that one ought to act in accordance with the moral law. The moral law is universal and one that all people have a duty to follow, according to Kant (Johnson and Cureton 2021). Ultimately, freedom and morality, reciprocally imply one another (Green 1992, p148). Thus, his ethical system involves a freedom and duty to act in accordance with the moral law. In Kierkegaard and Kant: A Hidden Debt, Green argues that both Kierkegaard and Kant have this concern for human freedom. He highlights that Kierkegaard has a clear passion for human freedom that is influenced by Kant (1992, p149). Kierkegaard argues that sin is inexplicable, because it has its roots in freedom (Green 1992, p160). However, for Kierkegaard, the ethical sphere is not the only sphere of existence. In fact, he believes there are three existential stages of existence. The first is the aesthetic sphere which is characterised by an immersion in sensual experience and seeking worldly pleasures (McDonald 2021). The second stage is the Ethical sphere which is the sphere that is moved into once one leaves the aesthetic sphere (McDonald 2021). This is the sphere that Kierkegaard believes Kant's ethical system resides in. Kierkegaard's view of ethics is centralised around the claim that ethics is represented by prevailing social norms (McDonald 2021). The third sphere is the religious sphere. I will expand on this in a coming paragraph, but Kierkegaard believes that this sphere is one step further than the ethical sphere. Kierkegaard's claim is that it is possible to step outside the ethical.

This is relevant because I believe it highlights the similarity that the Knight of Faith and the devilish character share, which is that under a Kantian ethical system, their actions would all be considered morally wrong. Faust causes the suffering of others by making a deal with the devil, the merman kidnaps innocents, and Abraham conceals from Isaac and intends to kill him. For Kant, the three would all be considered evil as they do not act in accordance with the moral law. Unlike Kant, Kierkegaard addresses this supposed moral wrongdoing in Problema III. Throughout the chapter, he argues that the actions of both the devilish characters and Abraham are incomprehensible and thus are beyond an ethical system. As I previously mentioned, sin is inexplicable for Kierkegaard. For example, Green describes that both the merman and the knight of faith have suspended the ethical, one through obedience and one through sin (Lippitt 2003, p123). Kierkegaard argues that Faust's is also silent, so ethics condemn him (2005, p135). The devilish characters' actions are incomprehensible because of their evil doing. However, while this reading shows that Abraham's actions are also beyond the ethical sphere, Kierkegaard argues the result is not evil doing as with the devilish characters. In the following paragraph, I will attempt to highlight this.

It seems clear that Kierkegaard is critiquing Kant's ethical system when he includes a third, further existential sphere. Kierkegaard argues that the individual has the responsibility to choose faith and enter the religious sphere (McDonald 2021). He argues that it is not a choice that can be made using reason. Instead, Kierkegaard argues one must suspend reason in order to believe in something higher than it, they must believe by virtue of the absurd (McDonald 2021). Ultimately one has to consistently choose faith throughout their life, which can be a difficult choice to make because it involves suspending reason. I believe this is what highlights how Kierkegaard shows Abraham to be different from the devilish characters; all three characters' actions are unintelligible. However, in the case of Abraham, not only does he not speak, but he cannot speak. He cannot make himself understood (Kierkegaard 2005, p138). Herein lies the key difference between the unintelligibility of the devilish characters and Abraham. He is unable to communicate his situation because he believes in a paradox and has unwavering faith in God. As I highlighted before, Kierkegaard argues that faith is something that is unable to be understood through reason. Thus, this is why his actions are incomprehensible. The Merman and Faust do not have faith. They have the ability to return to the ethical sphere. The knight of faith cannot. I believe Green puts this point succinctly. He argues that Abraham is not justified by his achievements within a moral universe, but by his personal relationship with God (Green 1993, p198). The Knight of Faith is a character that Kierkegaard uses as an extreme example of taking the leap into faith. His actions may seem morally dubious and unintelligible to someone like Kant who is stuck in the ethical sphere of existence, but Abraham trusting in God, is rewarded for his faith. I would argue this highlights Kierkegaard's goal with Fear and Trembling perfectly. Faith may be something that is incomprehensible, but it is something Kierkegaard believes we should choose anyway.

To conclude, I believe I have shown how the difference between Abraham as the knight of faith and the devilish characters unveils the aims of Kierkegaard's work in critiquing Kant and establishing the importance of the religious sphere. The characters are similar in that the devilish characters and the Knight of Faith's actions are all incomprehensible. However, they differ because the incomprehensibility of Faust and the Merman are down to their evil, whereas Abraham's incomprehensibility comes from him ascending from the ethical sphere to the religious sphere. Kierkegaard may have agreed with Kant in that there is an ethical sphere in which an ethical system may be played out, ultimately the actions of Abraham are not bound by this system. This is because he is acting through his incommunicable faith but the devilish characters are not.

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METAPHYSICS

HOW DOES JUDITH BUTLER UPDATE OR 'DRAMATIZE' HEGEL'S DIALECTIC OF ESSENCE AND APPEARANCE?

Carol-Anne Calder

In this essay, I will be focusing on how Judith Butler updates or 'dramatizes' Hegel's dialectic of essence and appearance. In order to do this, I will look at Hegel's account of essence and appearance by looking at Hegel's Encyclopaedia of Logic and his Science of Logic in order to understand his account. I will also be looking at Butler's dramatized version of Hegel's account by looking at Butler's Performative Acts and Gender Constitution text as well as her book Gender Trouble. Through this, I will be showing how Butler takes Hegel's account of essence and appearance and 'dramatizes' it by changing the roles of essence and appearance through her concept of performance, which adds a social-historical dimension. She also replaces the substance metaphysics that serves as the basis of Hegel's account of essence and appearance with an ontology of present participles. This addresses the core differences in understanding the world, being against becoming which started with Parmenides and Heraclitus.

I will firstly look at Hegel's account of essence and appearance in order to understand what is dramatized by Butler. Hegel's account of essence and appearance is a dialectical one. I will be looking at section 131 of Hegel's Encyclopaedia of Logic. In this section, Hegel gives an account of essence and appearance. I will focus on the background first before focusing on that section.

Hegel's account is one that argues against Kant's phenomena and noumena distinction in which the phenomena reflects the noumena. Kant also says that the reflection belongs to the subject. The world of being, which is noumena, is objective whereas the world of appearances is subjective, and we cannot get out of the world of appearances. For Hegel, the relationship between essence and appearance is different to Kant. Phenomena is part of the world for Hegel, there is no noumena, there is only phenomena. Essence is the agent of appearance, as appearances are related to other things and so belong in the world. Essence does exist, but only appears as itself when the totality of all possible appearances occurs. Essence and appearance are not separate, they both belong in the world and don't depend on subjective viewing of them. This is where Hegel disagrees with Kant in terms of the subjectivity of appearance. Essence and appearance are also sufficient on their own, they do not require anything else, so they don't rely on a subject to be there in order to appear.

In the section I mentioned above, Hegel explains the roles of essence and appearance which creates the dialectical account. "The Essence must appear or shine forth. Its shining or reflection, in it is the suspension and translation of it to immediacy, which, while as a reflection-on-self it is a matter of subsidence, is also form, reflection-on-something-else, a subsidence that sets itself aside. To show or shine is the characteristic by which essence is distinguished from being – by which it is essence; and it is this show which, when it is developed, shows itself, and is Appearance. Essence accordingly is not something beyond or behind appearance, but – just because it is the essence which exists – the existence is Appearance (forth shining)." This passage

is very important as this is the basis of the roles that essence and appearance have for Hegel. I will break this down in order to understand it works. For Hegel, essence must come forward and appear. Appearances that we see are essence, but they are not the sum total of what essence is. Essence is also the indeterminate possibility, where appearance is the determinate actuality. Appearance will never exhaust essence, as there is so much potentiality that isn't actualised. Essence is the totality of all possible appearances which cannot be actualised all at once.

This is developed on in the next part of the section. Hegel argues that appearance is when existence is stated explicitly in its contradiction. This is due to the world being full of contradiction for Hegel, so things that appear must exist in contradiction. This is due to appearance being determinate, which makes it higher than essence as essence is indeterminate being. For Hegel, substance is not a thing, but a thought. This is due to his logic. Substance is the pure idea, as logic deals with the not determined conceptions of substance. Examples of this for Hegel are pure being, which is the same as pure nothing. In the Science of Logic, Hegel discusses being, nothing and becoming. Being when it is pure being has no determination, so there is nothing that can be determined. It is equal to itself and cannot be unequal with others as there is no difference in it. The same applies to pure nothing, as there isn't anything that is determined within it. It is also equal to itself as there is no difference in it. Therefore, they are both the same as each other due to the indeterminacy in both. Becoming is the stage in which pure being and pure nothing is where they vanish into each other as they are opposites, yet they are the same. Their truth is found when they move into each other, which is becoming as the distinction is dissolved. This is very important when it comes to appearance which is determinate being, as it is the specific things that exist, and essence exists in the state of indeterminacy.

Hegel's account holds similarities with the Parmenidean account. This is due to them both basing their theories on the idea that the world just is. There cannot be any change, and what is not cannot be. If it is not, it cannot exist. Therefore, the world just is. For Parmenides, thought and being are the same, which is very similar to Hegel's account that essence and appearance are the same. This also is very similar to Aristotle's idea of substance as the base of everything, and other categories helping us distinguish what things are. For Hegel, essence is the base of everything, and appearances are the specific things, like a human or a rose. The appearance is what exists but determined into a human or a rose. This lies on the Parmenidean side of metaphysical theory.

I will now look at Butler's account, referencing back to Hegel's in order to see what has been dramatized. I will firstly look at the change of roles for essence and appearance through her concept of performance which added a social-historical dimension. I will then look at the change from the substance metaphysics which forms the basis of Hegel's theory to an ontology of present participles which replaces the former.

Butler takes Hegel's account of essence and appearance, as mentioned above, but she changes the role of essence. She does so by arguing that essence is the thing that does all of the appearing, instead of it being the agent that causes the appearances in Hegel. Butler uses this in order to explain her distinction between sex and gender. Sex is based upon several biological markers, whereas gender is constructed and performed. Examples of this can be a biological male playing a female in a play, or a male playing a female in a play. The performance of gender is the appearance that has no agent. This is due to a historical dimension of Butler in which a concept (man) grows and changes over time, and any new act adds to the concept of man. Being a man now will be different to being a man in the 12th century, as acts and doings have been added to the possible doings through history. This allows for changes in how concepts are understood and then made into actings. This adds a very important social-historical dimension as the way actions are performed, recognised and reacted to are dependent on the time period and societal norms of the time. This allows for development

through time as well as not determining one way to act as correct. This is clear in her argument about what makes femininity. In this, Butler distinguishes between sex and gender. Sex is a biological fact, whereas gender is more of a social and historical one. Butler starts from the historical context with a reference to de Beauvoir in which womanhood is made. This is understood through actions, which she then expands to a social understanding too. The way de Beauvoir looks at femininity is very important as it replaces looking at it as a natural fact to a historical creation. This is a big influence on Butler as she builds on this for her social-historical understanding of performance of gender. She also uses some work of Merleau-Ponty in order to develop how this could be understood. Butler uses the work of Merleau-Ponty to back up her removal of a subject or agent which is replaced with infinite possibilities that can be realised repeatedly. This does not depend on some internal essence, so it does not need an agent to be behind it happening.

This is very important as this affects the way we speak about this. This then leads to the change from substance metaphysics to an ontology of present participles which replaces the former for Butler. The standard subject predicate ontology which is present in most metaphysics (including Hegel's) informs how we speak about and understand the world around us. An example of this is the apple (subject) is green (predicate). This would reflect an agent and an appearance on that agent. Butler wants this to change and to move grammar to an ontology of present participles, which would replace the subject predicate ontology. An ontology of present participles consists of becoming and being. Becoming is all of the possible acting that can be done and being is a set choreography of acting or doing. It is important that the choreography is re-makable, so it can be reorganised in many ways. This is due to the entirety of possibilities that are always growing. When this is used instead of the substance metaphysics, the way the world is viewed changes. The world becomes something that can be made, through the actings that take place in it. The actings constitute the world, but there is an infinite amount of actings that have the potential to be realised.

This is similar to Whitehead's process metaphysics, as there is a process of becoming that is changeable. The actions that take place are what create the world, and there is no one way to make the world. The emphasis of the becoming within Butler's ontology of present participles links to Heraclitus' metaphysics. The similarities between Heraclitus and Butler is important to note, as despite all the advances the basis of both theories is the same. That there is flux and change, the world is in a constant state of becoming. Despite the complexity of Butler's account, it firmly sits on the Heraclitan side of metaphysical theory.

Butler's updated or dramatized account of Hegel's dialectic of essence and appearance seems to address the main issue with Hegel's theory as mentioned previously. This is due to the removal of essence as a driving force for appearances, as well as appearances becoming actings. The removal of an agent behind appearances is very important as causes a shift in how we think of ourselves as subjects. We view ourselves as something that can actualise many different possibilities over and over. This also incorporates the social-historical dimension as the possibilities are built on through historical and social which allows for more and more possibilities that can be actualised. Butler also proposes a swap from the subject-predicate metaphysics to an ontology of present participles. This would change the language that we use when talking about subjects and objects. This allows us to talk about actings, which includes performance of choreography sets, which can include femininity and masculinity. These actings create the world in which we live, which are becoming until they are acted and then they are brought into the world. If we didn't have any actings in the world, we could not create it.

To conclude, I have shown that Butler dramatizes Hegel's account of essence and appearance by changing the roles of both. Butler does this by updating the roles of essence and appearance through her concept of performance which has added a social-historical dimension that was not present in Hegel. Butler also replaced the substance metaphysics that was the basis of Hegel's account of essence and appearance with

an ontology of present participles. This is very important as it shows the differences between looking at the world as being which is Hegel's view, and looking at the world as becoming as Butler does. This reflects the oldest metaphysical views of Parmenides and Heraclitus and the way the world will look depending on which is subscribed to.

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NOTES

1 Hegel, 1975, §131

2 Hegel, 1975, §131

3 Hegel, 2010, pp. 59-60

4 Parmenides, 2011, 28b1-b4

5 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 2011,1003a20-b23

6 Butler, 1988, pp. 520-21

7 Butler, 1988, pp. 521-22

8 Whitehead, 1939, pp. 186-192

9 Heraclitus, 2011, DKb12, DKb91

DOES THE WORLD DEPEND ON OUR PERCEPTION OF IT?

What does Berkeley mean when he argues that 'to be is to be perceived'? How might the objections to such a view be countered?

François Hay

Berkeley's philosophy – a form of idealism often coined 'immaterialism' or 'subjective idealism' – makes the claim 'to be is to be perceived'. This assertion in itself appears straightforward; in order for something to exist, it must be apparent to sensible experience (perception). Yet, how does Berkeley make the logical steps to determine this? It seems counter-intuitive to say that something requires the perception of another thing in order to come into existence, for common sense dictates that objects exist prior to being perceived. In this essay, I will outline precisely what Berkeley means by his claim, drawing inference from his views on God in order to support him. Despite this religious standpoint being a common scholastic debate, I alternatively seek to show how Berkeley omits our senses themselves in his argument. I shall be referring to G.E. Moore's Refutation of Idealism (1903), aiming to demonstrate why this is a stronger critique than Russell's or Kant's. I also aim to express how the availability of language, and importance of religious dogmatism in Berkeley's era may have played a role in his ability to communicate his argument accurately. However, being quite the exponent of immaterialism, I intend to defend Berkeley using his own argument, and subsequently referring to Whitehead's exploration of modern Science to suggest why an idealistic perspective might be closer to nature than many philosophers lead us to believe.

18th Century thought had not recovered from absolute scepticism, which Berkeley believed was due to the belief in mind-independent objects (materialism). This conviction suggested that we could not gain true knowledge of anything, as things are outside of mind. There emerged a distinction between the terms 'ideas' and 'perceptions' – the former relating to mental occurrences such as thoughts, the latter referring to our experiences of objects in the world. Berkeley suggested that 'idea' presupposes a perception, and so the two terms are synonymous, for example; hearing gives us the idea of sound, tasting gives us the idea of sweetness, and so on. He believed that the world around us is made up only of ideas and minds to perceive them: "Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things [...] we deny they can subsist without the minds which perceive them." (Berkeley, 1998, p.119 [1710]). So, what is a perceivable object? What is this notepad on my desk? For Berkeley, it is merely a bundle of all of the ideas conveyed to us by the senses. It has a certain shape, colour, material etc. all accounting for this one thing which, for me, is a notepad. Deduct all of these ideas that I have gained through this particular perception, along with my perception of other notepads throughout my life, and I am left with nothing. He goes on to make the claim that you cannot conceive of an unperceivable object, for all knowledge comes from things that we have perceived – cementing his belief as an empiricist. Therefore, all sensible objects are necessarily dependent on perception within a mind. (It must be noted that for Berkeley, these cannot be animals for they cannot hold ideas: "The constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal are body, life, sense, and spontaneous motion" (Berkeley, p.71)). This philosophy is frequently misunderstood, such as by Samuel Johnson who famously exclaimed 'I refute it THUS!' after feeling pain from kicking a stone (Boswell, 1907, p.292-3). Berkeley does not mean to say that objects are not real, he wants to state that these objects are nothing but our sensory experience of them – they are mind dependent. The term 'sense-data' has been used to describe this, for example in Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy. The stone is its properties, not a thing in itself. One might ask, what about a tree on an undiscovered island with no mind to perceive it? Is the island even there in the first place? Berkeley holds that God is the cause of our sensible world, and he

perceives all. We, as finite human minds, are only capable of imagination, whereas God has implanted these ideas of things within us. Berkeley refers to a 'passive' mind (the meaning of which has come under scrutiny, but for the purpose of this paper I shall stick with one) meaning the mind has a capacity to receive ideas. My passive mind forms clear and distinct ideas of the external world. My idea of the island is not as clear as the ideas given to me of this notepad. God is what keeps our external world clear and distinct, so it follows that he is perceiving everything with an active mind, seeing as minds are the causes of ideas. This explains why objects don't spontaneously appear when we enter new situations. God acts as a mediator between us and the world, as the originator of these ideas which I can bundle together, with his goodness reflected on how coherent and predictable experience is. We are within the entirety of what God perceives, and God is within everything that we perceive. Without him, the world around us would be random and inconceivable for our finite minds. In fact, it would not even exist (Berkeley, 1998, p.158-159 [1710]). This gives rise to some problematic aspects, but for the purpose of this investigation I shall grant Berkeley's deduction for God's existence.

When trying to refute immaterialism, we encounter difficulty. Philosophers have pointed out flaws with Berkeley's use of language rather than his ontology. For example, Bertrand Russell observes that Berkeley never specifies what he means by a 'mental' occurrence, which raises difficulties with the claim that the brain itself is a sensible thing, and therefore also mental (Russell, 1946, p.592). This leads us to a surface level language problem, looking at misunderstandings rather than falsities in ontology. An epoch dependent vocabulary may have had a role to play here, which I will explore further later. Kant presents 'Transcendental Idealism', which he devised as a more accurate way to tackle metaphysics. He makes a claim about a phenomenal and a noumenal. The phenomenal relates to appearances (what Berkeley believed to be reality – mind dependent). The noumenal may well be reality – where things in themselves belong. Kant believed this to be a priori knowledge in the mind, unlike Plato's theory of forms which was a world separate to ours. Kant asserts that the noumenal is related to intelligible existences, meaning that we can think about it, but cannot sense it (Kant, 2004, B306 [1787]). Therefore, we never learn the relationship between the phenomenal and the noumenal, and are left with 'we cannot know', which to me is unsatisfactory. We may draw similarities between the noumenal and Berkeley's God, being a real thing that interacts with our perceivable reality, knowledge of which cannot be gained due to the finitude of our minds. G.E. Moore suggests another problem. He declares that when Berkeley "supposed that the only thing of which I am directly aware is my own sensation and ideas, he supposed what was false" (Moore, 1903, p.453). He goes on to make the remark that we have as much evidence for our very sensations (such as sight, touch, taste) as we do for material objects. My body itself is a sensible object, through which I perceive other sensible objects. I can make the claim that I am touching this notepad as much as I can make the claim that this notepad is there at all. It follows from this supposition that if material things do not exist in themselves, neither does my experience (ibid.). From this it seems that Berkeley fails to distinguish between perception itself, and the act of perceiving. The case may be that we have a faculty of perception within ourselves, and that we are able to use it to navigate the world. However, this is only an act, not a thing in itself. 'To be is to be perceived' suggests that existence necessarily requires perception, but it fails to demonstrate that perception is a thing itself (according to immaterialist logic). Instead, it shows us that we are beings who are able to perform an act, and through this act we are able to interact, name, and attach meaning to ideas which we then call things. However, if these things are merely sensible, then they have no transcendental significance, meaning that they have no value beyond what it is that we perceive; they exist as pure sensibility. From this we can infer that our experience has no transcendence either, as the faculties we use to experience are as material as the objects we are denying. I believe that this interpretation of Moore's critique of Berkeley holds weight, however I do not contend that a man such as Berkeley who placed so much faith in God would allow for us to believe that his argument should lead to this outlook, which mirrors the pessimism of some 19th/20th Century thought.

Various interpretations of Berkeley have commented on how pushing his argument to its limit would logically lead to solipsism, being the belief that the self is all that can be known to exist. Similarly, Moore could be interpreted by suggesting that Berkeley leads us to a deterministic world view, where our experience doesn't exist in itself, for it is experienced through God, and our actions are meaningless for they are God's will. That being said, I don't think that either of these views are what Berkeley intended. On the contrary to the solipsist who is an absolute sceptic, he was seeking to argue against materialism, which gives rise to scepticism due to an inability to gain knowledge on mind-independent objects. The world would then be left as a bizarre occurrence in history, with humans as agents endowed with perception, who endlessly contemplate what is unknowable (Berkeley, 1998, p.109 [1710]). In Science and the Modern World, Whitehead's chapter on Quantum Theory gives insight on how atoms work within our world. He indicates how they have only a limited number of ways to act, all determined by what he calls the electromagnetic field, which is essentially the invisible realm through which things such as light must pass through in order to reach our senses. He states: "An electron for us is merely the pattern of its aspects in its environment, so far as those aspects are relevant to the electromagnetic field." (Whitehead, 1926, p.165). Here, I believe that what Whitehead calls the 'electromagnetic field' could be aligned with Berkeley's God; a lens through which we experience the world, which we have no control over but allows us to encounter these ideas. Like God, (and as mentioned above, like Kant's noumenon) this electromagnetic field might be existing in a way that we cannot comprehend, thus remaining invisible to us despite the fact that it is really there, affecting our reality (Berkeley, 1998, p.158). Moore may be correct in his deduction that our senses and thus experience do not exist in themselves, but Berkeley's argument would hold with our senses being relations to this invisible field through which we experience the world. We could also refer to what is called the observer effect, which has shown that through our observation, we reduce 'interference' on the external world. By acting as what is called a quantum observer, we force electrons to act as particles rather than as waves (American Committee for the Weizmann Institute of Science, 1998). This would support the idea of our undiscovered island really being there as it is within this electromagnetic field, but only once we as human beings have observed it, can we paint a picture of what it really looks like by altering the way the electrons act. Through our very observation, we are imposing a perceptible reality. Berkeley may have foreseen a scientific truth, albeit limited by the terminology and religious dogmatism of the time.

Perhaps Berkeley's doctrine is not quite as simple as it seemed at the outset. To understand him properly requires imagining a world with no matter, merely ideas. A world where objects do not have an existence independent of our minds; where a tree is not a tree in itself, rather the word 'tree' is what we have given to what we sense as a tall, hard, brown and green, wooden, leaved object that grows from the ground. For Berkeley, this world is our world, and it is kept coherent and predictable thanks to the absolute perceiving power that is God. The doctrine invites a few criticisms, critiques to do with his use of language, his truth claims on things that we ultimately cannot know, and perhaps neglecting important considerations such as our own perception and experience in themselves. However, Berkeley for me holds an important position in modern Science and Philosophy. He called upon us to see a world where our experience is purely relative, and where the subject has autonomy in finding knowledge about things, for what we sense is the real thing. Regardless of what we look at, smell, taste, interact with, the important aspect of those experiences are our perceptions of them. Berkeley allows us to see through perceptual biases and puts us on the starting line towards constructing a more positive and appreciative outlook on our natural world and metaphysics.

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PHENOMENOLOGY

WHAT CAN THE EXPERIENCE OF PSYCHOSIS REVEAL ABOUT THE NATURE OF REALITY?

What can we infer from the phenomenology of the psychoses about autopoietic systems?

François Hay

In this essay, I will be arguing that the phenomenology of the psychoses, in particular symptoms of hallucination and delusion, demonstrates the validity of the theory of autopoiesis in explaining living systems. In order to do this, I will begin by outlining what is meant by an autopoietic system, according to Maturana and Varela. Then, I will investigate Laing's interpretation of the phenomenology of mental illness in order to understand the relationship between perception, self-identity, and autopoiesis. I will finish by synthesizing these ideas with Freud, and how neuroses may indicate an intentional, albeit potentially detrimental, self-replicating system. Throughout, I will be using Langer and Bentall, who both contribute to theories of mind and mental illness, to further substantiate my claims.

Maturana and Varela describe autopoietic machines as systems which have their "own organisation (defining network of relations) as the fundamental variable which [they maintain] constant" (Maturana and Varela, 1980, p79). This organisation alludes to the autonomous self-organisation of living systems, with living systems being themselves autopoietic. These machines are adaptable to their environment, because they are capable of compensating for external perturbations with changes to the components determining their internal structure (ibid. p81). An example of this is an individual undergoing a traumatic experience, which we will return to later. This environment, in and through which an organism emerges and navigates, allows the organism to make sense of the world. The sense that is made of the world as a result of a particular organisation brings forth a particular phenomenology. The organism extracts information from the world it is given and represents it within its perceptual framework. The external world acts as the external perturbation on the senses, giving rise to what Langer refers to as an "ambient world" (Langer, 1967, p282): that through which an organism experiences its way of being in the world. The essence of the living organism, which is the organisation, is left marked by external influences, in this case being the pre-given world. Should there be an external event which outweighs the autopoietic machine's ability to compensate, then the machine will disintegrate. The relevant example for us is simply biological death, which Laing notes as the "only real death we recognise" (Laing, 1990, p38). Should there be a psychotic experience of death with no adequate external stimulus to cause the biological breakdown of the autopoietic machine – the human – then this tension may be retained and reproduced as a neurosis, due to a component requiring change but the structure remaining the same (Freud, 1961, p25-26). There is a particular physical structure that is reproduced throughout the development of an autopoietic machine. The components can change, but in order for the machine to retain its fundamental organisation, it must incorporate these changes into its structure. The relations which define a machine – that is, its organisation – as autopoietic are exactly what remains constant (Maturana and Varela, 1980, p80-81). Disintegration comes only when the autopoietic organisation is lost. The machine must function "as a unity in a history of structural change in which the autopoietic organization remains invariant (ibid. p87). Should there be just enough of a kernel of organisation that the organism can cling on to, then it will not disintegrate, but

rather carry on according to its predisposition, albeit in part changed to varying degrees. We see this in the psychotic individual who clearly remains human but has a vastly different way of experiencing being human. Their identity and view on themselves may go through numerous changes but something remains the same, and that is precisely its autopoietic organisation. It could perhaps be said that the experience of something such as paranoid delusion is the only remaining defence mechanism the psychotic has against what otherwise appears to be an overly perturbing, organisation destroying, external world (Laing, 1990, p77).

The experience and consequent classification of psychosis varies. What is seen as a delusion in one culture may fit into the system of beliefs in another and may even be regarded as a higher level of insight (Bentall, 2004, p134). Some people also experience hallucinations but are able to cope perfectly well (ibid. p355). For our purposes, we will investigate only distressing experiences. What is commonly regarded as destructive, namely mental illness, may act as a peculiar means of maintaining an autopoietic system. Hallucinations or delusory thinking can cause a psychotic patient much distress, but could a reason for these experiences be that they are necessary in order for the patient to maintain a sense of identity and a manner of navigating reality? R.D. Laing, in The Divided Self, outlines two key concepts: 'existential phenomenology' and 'ontological security'. To take the former concept first, Laing says that "it is the task of existential phenomenology to articulate what the other's 'world' is and his way of being in it" (Laing, 1990, p25). The experience of, say, delusions, is to be explained as a way in which the experiencer is in the world, in particular their world – or ambient world. To understand the particular subjectivity of the person "requires us to relate his actions to his way of experiencing the situation he is in with us" (ibid. p32). Somewhat ironically, there seems to be something within the experience of such torment that gives the patient a level of comfort, that encourages the subject to continue thinking as such. There is a level of autopoiesis still present in the psychotic patient, giving a certain value to their own personal truth, compelling them to continue indulging in certain thoughts despite how fearsome they may be, or how negatively they are impacting the rest of the patient's life. Laing says that such a person is ontologically insecure. "The ontologically insecure person is preoccupied with preserving rather than gratifying himself: the ordinary circumstances of living threaten his low threshold of security" (ibid. p42). The lived experience of someone such as the psychiatrist appears to the sufferer as a threat to his reality. In his preoccupation with preserving himself, his notion of self has been lost in a myriad of biological and social interconnections, leading him to preserving a particular kind of self-organisation that is, to him, his only way of keeping grasp on reality. "A false-self system … may consist in an amalgam of various part selves, none of which is so fully developed as to have a comprehensive personality of its own" (ibid. p73), and "the schizoid state … can be understood as an attempt to preserve a being that is precariously structured" (ibid. p77). The schizoid individual is thus ontologically insecure, as there is no particular identity that they give credence to. Instead, they experience the constant splitting of personality as they try to preserve this fragmented understanding of themselves. Naturally, this is met with anxiety when met with the Other, as we mentioned above, who may seem to merely exist in a way that is threatening to the patient's 'self' and "his capacity to act autonomously" (ibid. p47). When the organisation of the self is such as to continually shift what the self is in order to approach the world in a non-threatening way – granted, this is near impossible for the patient due to the fact that we do live in a shared world – and biological explanations of mental illness are fraught with ambiguity and unsustainability without support from environmental explanations (Bentall, 2004), perhaps the theory of autopoiesis can help us to understand a more fundamental mechanism that directs self-organisation in a way that need not view consciousness as something secondary.

There is a clear connection between autopoiesis and the experience of psychosis. Freud describes "the course taken by mental events" as "automatically regulated by the pleasure principle" (Freud, 1961, p1), which endeavours to orient the individual towards seeking pleasure. Freud sees neuroses as a conflict "between life instincts and death instincts" (ibid. p47). In our investigation so far, it seems that the experience of disturbing thoughts or appearances can be distressing whilst protective of a more fundamental recognition of the self, or perhaps of a perturbing event in the past. Bentall notes that "delusional ideas rarely lack a nugget of truth", but that "the nugget of truth is usually distorted" (Bentall, 2004, p208). The event that marked the organism with the experiential capacity for delusion may be this nugget of truth indeed, experienced as a particular intensity (Langer, 1964, p17). This distortion can be said to be the autopoietic reorganisation of the organic components, allowing it to still function within society. The brain of the psychotic may have been exposed to an event of a certain intensity. The event, or more specifically the interpretation of it, may have led the individual to repress the disturbing idea in order for them to retain the self that they were at the moment just before the event; the self that they wish to remain as in order to gain pleasure from a reality in which the event never happened. Of course, this conflicts with the reality principle, which seeks the necessary enduring of temporary un-pleasures in order to discover what may be a longer path to pleasure (Freud, 1961, p4). When the pleasure principle overcomes the reality principle, the "organism as a whole" is negatively affected, and neurosis ensues. The task of the psychiatrist, for Freud, is to get the patient to "re-experience some portion of his forgotten life" whilst allowing the patient to maintain a distance from the traumatic event, in order to "recognize that what appears to be reality is in fact only a reflection of a forgotten past" (ibid. p13). For Laing, this would require a certain level of plasticity on the part of the psychiatrist. He must "draw on his own psychotic possibilities, without forgoing his sanity" (Laing, 1990, p34) in order to understand the patient's existential position – and perhaps reciprocally, gaining a better understanding of his own. This plasticity implies the component of the autopoietic system which is capable of changing without threatening the fundamental organisation, or in this case the sanity, of the organism. Freud says that "protection against stimuli is an almost more important function for the living organism than reception of stimuli" (Freud, 1961, p21). What we saw above as the attempt by the autopoietic machine to cut out irrelevant information is highlighted in the organisation of psychosis. "The brain, it seems, prioritizes the processing of information that is perceived to be important to the self" (Bentall, 2004, p200). It appears, then, that self-consciousness is that towards which the autopoietic functioning of a system works. As we saw with Laing, the schizoid individual produces a false-self in order to protect themselves from the external world or from traumatic events. The autopoiesis of the psychotic machine will thus be working to protect and strengthen the false-self system, and the reality to which the psychiatrist has to partly yield for access, which follows the pleasure principle as opposed to the reality principle (which would require the individual to confront an experience incompatible with their current organisation). The theory of autopoiesis thus stands. In the situation where the external world can be nothing other than perturbing, we see hospitalisation and for some even suicide. In other cases, the drive to self-preservation is yearning to be expressed through commonly 'ununderstandable' means (Bentall, 2004, p28), with these ununderstandable means being the refigured components which would be incompatible with autopoietic organisation should they exist as anything else.

To conclude, we have investigated the mechanics of autopoiesis and how mental illness can explain the autopoietic self-organisation of the human living organism. The living organism is able to change its components in order to maintain its organisation. Using Laing's work to understand the phenomenology of psychosis, we saw that the psychotic experience is the way in which an individual navigates the reality that the self they understand to possess inhabits. Distressing thoughts and appearances act as a way of preserving

this particular self-organisation, and thus the corresponding picture of reality. We used Freud to synthesize the theory of autopoiesis with the experience of psychosis and saw that the phenomenology particular to what would generally be regarded as abnormal experience can in fact shed light on how the human mind organises itself in order to protect itself. The experience may be distressing, but to certain brains it appears that this distress does not outweigh the trauma associated with particular events. It seems, then, that this synthesis permits us to view consciousness as a fundamental structure of nature. The desire of the autopoietic machine to cling on to an experience that may in fact not hold weight in the world of physics, suggests that something other than the basic collision and interpretation of matter is at play. There seems to be a primary function of nature, allowing for self-organisation in a manner that can appear destructive to the biological organism itself, that does not depend on the mere dialectical interplay of unconscious matter. Perhaps the experience of the objective material world relies on a proper adherence to the reality principle. Or what I would rather suggest, is that the capacity for experience itself (consciousness) is fundamental, and living organisms will always try to organise themselves in order to preserve this rather than maintain what is purported as scientifically objective.

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HOW WE EXPERIENCE VIDEO GAMES

Apply Husserl's account of perception, imagination, sign and image-consciousness to a specific type of cultural production: painting, novel, comics, movies, etc. Develop a phenomenological account of the way in which we become conscious of certain objects through the medium of such cultural production. Focus on the different role that perception, imagination, sign and image-consciousness play in it.

Carol-Anne Calder

In this essay, I will be applying Husserl's account of perception, imagination, sign and image-consciousness to video games. In doing so, I will be developing a phenomenological account of the way in which we become conscious of certain objects through the medium of such cultural production. I will also be focusing on the different role that perception, imagination, sign and image-consciousness play in it.

Firstly, I will go through Husserl's account of perception, imagination, sign and image-consciousness before applying it to video games. Perception for Husserl is considered as the most basic way we have intentional lived experience. When I perceive something, that object is given to me in person, which means it is directly given to me. The object is given in a blend of presence and absence. What is present can become absent and what is absent can become present depending on how I am perceiving the object. This shows that the object is more than what is present at any given time. This is due to the combination of the shape of the object being transcendent (which is used to mean things that are external to us, but to avoid the connotations of previous theories), the way we perceive and react to the object are immanent (which is used to mean internal, also to avoid connotations of previous theories). Hyletic data that corresponds to the shape and colour of the object are immanent. Hyletic data is something that is constantly changing depending on how we see the object as well as our beliefs about that object. Hyletic data is considered to be moved by something called noeses. Hyletic data is then captured as manifestations of the transcendent properties that they correspond to. Both hyletic data and noeses together create the immanent content of perception and the consciousness of it. Once the object is perceived as perceived, it is called noema. Noema will be the total of all the hyletic data understood through the transcendent properties of the object.

Imagination for Husserl has a few different roles; imagination is an intentional act for Husserl, but it is not characterised by belief. This makes it different to perception as perception involves beliefs in terms of how we respond to the object that we are perceiving. Imagination cannot do this as there are no objects directly given in imagination. There is a realistic form of imagination that is called anticipation, and that is where empty intentions are made before you perceive something. Once you are perceiving what you have imagined, some empty intentions will become filled intentions as they become real. Some will stay empty as they will not become real. This is important as the identity of what I imagine is not fixed because it cannot be given in person, like how it is in perception. The objects that are imagined cannot be given to us in person in this world we inhabit. Instead, they are outside of our world which allows for many things to be understood without being directly perceived. This allows the identity of the object to be created by the individual that is imagining it.

Sign and image-consciousness for Husserl are very important. Sign or symbol consciousness is when signs or signals points to an object that isn't currently in front of me. It brings the object to mind but doesn't give us the object or a version of the object. Image-consciousness is where something represents an object that we can perceive but doesn't give me the object directly in perception. These will play very different roles in video

games, but both together will create an immersive atmosphere. In order to fully explain how both of these work, I will apply them to video games below.

As I am using video games for my example, I will be focusing on single player video games in order to develop a clear phenomenological account. Some things may be different for multiplayer video games, but I will not be covering such differences in this essay. In my summary of the phenomenological account of video games, I will make sure that any context that is needed is given.

For perception, the way video games are played is important. I will perceive the screen that the video game is being displayed on. I will also perceive whatever is running the video game, a console or computer, which includes the controls in order to play the video game. These objects that are given to me in person are required to be able to play the video game. However, when I am focused on playing the video game, the controls and the screen that is displaying it are present to me, and the console or computer is absent to me. If I decide to swap the video game or turn off the console or computer, the controls are then absent to me whilst the computer or console is present to me. When I am playing the video game, I am aware of what is happening on the screen, and reacting to the level in front of me, so I am also perceiving what is being displayed on the screen. If I am in an action or fighting level, I will be reacting to the enemies in the game (this also applies to multiplayer shooting games). When I am perceiving the level on screen in front of me, I am reacting to it. When I have reactions to what is happening within the video game, being shocked at something within the storyline, that is hyletic data which is moved through the fact that the video game is on the screen and it is given to me. Once my reaction to the video game and the video game itself are combined, it will create my consciousness of the game as well as playing the game. This can be understood as noema once I have perceived the video game and the specifics of the level are perceived, and I recognise that I have perceived those elements. Noema will be the totality of all the hyletic data understood through the transcendent properties of the video game.

Imagination is very important for video games. Before I play the video game, I imagine so many things about that game which creates the empty intentions for that game. However, being able to imagine means that I can think about many things that I cannot directly perceive. It also allows me to decide how I want to think about certain aspects of the video game, as it only will give a specific way I want to imagine the video game, which will depend on the title and the cover of the box. It can also be informed by my previous understanding of the video game from trailers and gameplay footage I may have seen. This will create an identity of the video game within my imagination. Video games will come with empty intentions before I start playing it. I will anticipate what the game will be like; the controls, the story, the difficulty. These will be empty intentions. Once I start playing the game, some of those intentions will become filled. Others will stay empty, some waiting to be filled once I have played more of the game or they will stay empty because the anticipation I held cannot be fulfilled (if the story is different to what I anticipated, or if the controls are different). As I play through the game, I will form more anticipations based on my filled intentions, which then leads to more empty intentions which then have the potential to become filled. These anticipations will also impact on how I play the game as well as my enjoyment from certain filled intentions. Imagination, along with empty and filled intentions together create a separate world in which the video game can exist whilst I play it. It can also create an immersive version of the world where I am playing the video game, but I am also acknowledging that the video game is not the same as the world I directly experience with certain objects.

For sign and image-consciousness, the design of the game is very important. The visual design of the areas within the game and the sound design for those areas. The image-consciousness that will come from playing a video game is usually linked to the design of the areas and levels within it. The virtual recreation that's done for tables, chairs, trees and other objects make for a more immersive experience. This will create image-

consciousness of whatever is in the level as long as it corresponds to an object that is encounterable to me outside of that video game. In the case of objects that I have not seen, either designed to be futuristic or from another planet, they can be broken down to make sense of them to create image-consciousness or they will be within sign consciousness. The music and ambience that has been included in the design of the area will also be within sign-consciousness due to the lack of correspondence to a specific object. Image-consciousness is very important within a video game as it will help you become more familiar with the environment within the video game to start with. Image-consciousness will also create more of an immersive experience which then affects my experience of the game.

Sign or symbol consciousness in video games help the player in numerous ways. If I am playing a video game and I am unsure of where I need to go next, several things can be used to signal where to go next. One way can be a beacon that shows in a version of view that requires a control input, which is usually used in single player level and area-based games. Another can be a form of compass that appears on the top of the screen that corresponds to the way I am facing in the game with how far away I am from certain things in game, which are usually used in what are called open world games in which you can explore the entire world within that game. Music can also be used as a sign to the mood of the video game. In levels where there is no danger, there will be ambient sounds as well as sounds which will reflect the environment within that level, like a forest. When there is danger, the music will shift to signal that for me. When I hear the different music and noises, I know whether I am safe to explore the area or whether I need to be ready for enemies.

In this essay, I have applied Husserl's account of perception, imagination, sign and image-consciousness to video games, which are a specific type of cultural production. In doing so, I have developed a phenomenological account of the way in which we become conscious of certain objects through the medium of such cultural production. I also have focused on the different roles that perception, imagination, sign and image-consciousness play in it.

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NOTES

1 Sokolowski, 2000, p.66

2 Drummond, 2007, pp.97-8

3 Drummond, 2007, pp. 144-5

4 Sokolowski, 2000, pp. 71-4

5 Sokolowski, 2000, pp. 82-5

6 Klevjer, 2019, pp. 728-9

NATURE & SCIENCE

THE DIVINITY OF NATURE

Does nature produce gods?

Ella Vennik

Nature as having a productive capacity is a hypothesis that one can easily make. I would posit that because of this productive capacity, nature produces gods. In this essay, I will be attempting to justify this postulate and also justify the consequences that follow from it. I will do this by first looking at Spinoza's philosophy of pantheism as potential support of my postulate followed by Jacobi's response to this. I will then move on to Schelling's argument in the "Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature" that nature is a self-creating process that is the direct cause of everything. This is an idea that is Spinozean in nature. From this I will extrapolate that if nature produces everything, this must also be productive of gods. I will lastly support my claim with Schelling's argument in "The History of Modern Philosophy" that his is a positive philosophy in comparison to Hegel's which is a negative philosophy. This positive philosophy highlights nature as being finite, wholly contingent and involves creation that occurs ubiquitously. I will use this to support the consequences of my postulate. To begin, I will outline my postulate and its consequences.

The postulate I am proposing is that nature produces gods. This postulate has certain consequences. Namely, that gods as the products of nature must share some of their important qualities. Nature is finite. There is proof of this in the constantly changing state of the world. Finite things can change, whereas infinite things must necessarily stay the same. Nature is immediate and all surrounding. There is proof of this in the fact that nature is inescapable. It is not possible to experience anything without experiencing nature. I would argue that gods as products of nature share these qualities. There is no way to describe where gods that are finite, immediate and all surrounding exist else to say they exist within nature itself. All products of nature are contained within itself, so gods must be included in nature as well. Therefore, nature itself is divine. This idea of a divine nature is supported by the philosopher Spinoza's philosophy of gods. Spinoza believed in a pantheism which is the view that God and nature are one and the same substance. Spinoza's main claim is that there is such a thing as substance which exists independent of anything else (Nadler 2019). According to Schelling there is only one kind of substance that exists. This substance is necessarily God (Nadler 2019). Jacobi, a philosopher heavily influenced by Spinoza, argued that Spinoza's god is the concept of existence itself (Beiser 1987 p55). Thus, the one substance that Schelling proposes includes everything. It includes both God and nature. However, unlike my postulate, Spinoza argues that this one substance of nature and god is infinite. In fact, he states that it is necessarily infinite (Nadler 2019). Jacobi argues that there is a dilemma in Spinoza's pantheism. He puts forward that if one believes in God then we must assume God is its own cause (Beiser 1987 p84). This implies the existence of an unconditioned cause. If one believes this then the principle of sufficient reason which states that everything must have a cause cannot be universally applied (Beiser 1987 p84). Herein is where the dilemma lies because in order to believe in the naturalism that Jacobi believes Spinoza proposes, one has to deny God as the unconditioned cause. Thus, nature could not be one and the same substance as God and Spinoza's argument fails. Therefore, while Spinoza's pantheism seems to align with my postulate at first look, Jacobi's problem shows this not to be the case.

In the Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, Schelling makes the case that only a philosophy where nature is the direct and originating cause of everything, can respond to the concerns of free and rational beings (Bubner p168). Schelling was directly influenced by Spinoza's philosophy. He develops Spinoza's view of nature as the unconditioned cause, as Jacobi claims, into a nature that is a self-developing totality. Schelling's is an applied philosophy. By this he means that it is the system of experiences as a whole (Bubner 1997 p168) in both historical and theoretical dimensions. He argues that one should allow natural science to arise naturally from philosophy (Bubner 1997 p170). Nature, as a system that is capable of reproducing and maintaining itself, must surely include the creation of humans and human knowledge. In fact, if nature did not exist, then neither could humans or human knowledge. We have proof of this in natural history. He unifies mind and matter in this sense (Bubner 1997 p197). This unity is no coincidence. Schelling argues that nature expresses and realises the laws of our mind (Bubner 1997 p209). Objects and ideas become inseparable. With natural things preceding thought (Bubner 1997 p175). This gives the concept of the 'I' an objective sense. In his work Of the I, Schelling makes the case that objects can only come as such as they relate to a subject. For Schelling, subjects can become objects for other subjects. So, it is accurate to say that subjects can be considered as objects (Schelling 1980 p74). With this in mind, it follows that nature has the ability to create mind that is considered as an object. Instead of seeing nature as a thing, Schelling sees nature as a process which is constantly self-creating (Bubner 1997 p201). Nature having this productive and creative capacity directly supports my postulate that nature produces gods. This is because a nature that is the creator of everything must also be the creator of gods. I would also argue that the power of creation is an entirely divine capacity. In the following paragraph I will further support this claim by showing how Schelling believes his is a positive philosophy that necessarily involves creation.

In his lecture on Hegel, found in The History of Modern Philosophy, Schelling argues that his philosophy that focuses on nature is a positive philosophy. This is in contrast to Hegel's philosophy which he calls a negative philosophy. Schelling states that Hegel's main claim is that, 'concept is god'. By this he means that concept precedes and is the creator of all (Schelling 1994 p135). He argues that this claim of Hegel's is wholly negative because it leaves nothing outside of itself (Schelling 1994 p135). His philosophy negates anything that is not concept and so begins with a negation (Schelling 1994 p135). Schelling states that while Hegel's negative philosophy is entirely excluding, his is a philosophy that is world involving (1994 p134). This positive philosophy must include creation Schelling argues. He states that the world is wholly and utterly contingent and the very fact that the world exists shows this. For Schelling, if something exists, it follows that it must have come into existence at some point. In order for something to have come into existence creation must have taken place (Schelling 1994 p151). According to Schelling, a positive philosophy must involve creation. Schelling argues that this creation is ubiquitous. It is found everywhere and at all times. Thus, Schelling has presented a nature that is finite, contingent and ubiquitous, and showed that this nature overcomes the downfalls of Hegel's philosophy as it is a positive one. Therefore, this positive philosophy of Schelling's directly supports my postulate and its consequences. Schelling not only describes a nature that is productive and capable of producing gods, but also describes it in such a way that it is finite, all surrounding and most importantly, divine. After all, if creation is the most important part of a philosophy, it naturally follows that this creation must be divine. This can be used as definitive justification for my postulate because Schelling has accurately represented that a creative nature is a necessary component of philosophy. Nature in this sense, must surely produce gods.

To conclude, I believe I have successfully justified my postulate and shown that nature does in fact produce gods. At first Spinoza's pantheism seemed to be supportive of my postulate as the idea that god and nature are one and the same substance aligned well with my reasoning. However, the dilemma that Jacobi presented shows that Spinoza's argument has a large problem in that it is not possible to see nature and god as the same substance and also universally apply the principle of sufficient reason. Thus, it is not possible to use Spinoza's theory as justification of my postulate. Then I looked at Schelling's philosophy of nature which was entirely more supportive of my claim. Schelling argues that nature is the process that produces all things, including humans and thus human thought. Nature precedes and is the cause of thought. He goes further to say that this creative and productive essence of nature is essential to his positive philosophy. Therefore, this serves as adequate justification for my postulate as it follows that a nature that is wholly creative and creates everything must also create gods.

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WHAT DOES WHITEHEAD MEAN WHEN HE SAYS THAT 'EVERYTHING IS EXPERIENCE' AND HOW DOES IT CHALLENGE TRADITIONAL MECHANISTIC CONCEPTIONS OF NATURE?

Ben Gilburt

Whitehead introduces the concept of process philosophy which replaces physical matter with events as the most basic building blocks of the universe. The essay title asks us to answer both the meaning of Whitehead's statement 'everything is experience' and how this challenges mechanistic conceptions of nature. I will be answering these questions in parallel as the essay unfolds, as the role of experience in Whitehead's system itself challenges mechanistic conceptions of nature, and issues Whitehead encountered with these conceptions were catalysts for the system he proposed and required that experience be built in. I will answer this question through two lenses. I will first introduce Newton's mechanistic account of nature and show how this is challenged by Whitehead's 'actual occasion' which will allow me to describe the role that experience plays in the most fundamental building blocks of reality for Whitehead. I will support this argument with the concept of Laplace' demon. Second, I will demonstrate how Cartesian mechanistic conception of nature is challenged by introducing Whitehead's concept of a 'Nexus', a conglomeration of actual occasions, and how this enables the experience found in the fundamental constituents of reality to be built into human experience. My final conclusion is that Whitehead's process physics uses experience to challenge two mechanistic conceptions of nature, but with varying levels of success, with experience on the fundamental level successfully addressing challenges inherent in Newton's system, but the role of this proto-mental experience failing to truly address the challenges of Cartesian dualism and still requiring a degree of emergentism to explain human experience.

I will now introduce a traditional mechanistic conception of nature and its inherent challenges, based primarily on Newton's mechanics. Newton's mechanics describes phenomena in the world "in terms of the conservation of motion through contact action" (Craver et al, 2019). We can understand this as an absolute vessel of space and time which objects exist within and every phenomenon observed in these objects is explained by 'accidental' external influence happening to them. These accidents may be objects bumping into each other, heating each other up and so on. All phenomena can be observed and understood with the right apparatus and knowledge, resulting in causal determinism, where all events happen necessarily as a result of the events that preceded them, environmental conditions and the laws of nature (Hoefer, 2016). This argument is articulated by Laplace and his concept of an all-knowing being, since described as a 'demon'. Laplace describes causal determinism as "the present state of the universe as the effect of its anterior state and the cause of the one which is to follow" (Laplace, 2019). Laplace then introduces an intelligence with the capability to assimilate and analyse a complete dataset about the universe in the present moment alongside the rules and forces that determine interactions between things. This 'demon', then, would be able to determine with complete certainty everything that has happened in the past and everything that will happen in the future through causal relationships. Bertrand Russell describes an issue arising from complete causal determinism when

trying to describe the prior conditions that caused an event to happen (Hoefer, 2016). For instance, a particular song playing may be sufficient reason for someone breaking into dance, but an endless list of other conditions may mean this is not the case, like an asteroid striking, the person sleeping, having a broken leg and so on ad infinitum. This complete causal determinism also breaks the second law of thermodynamics which states that energy moves from areas of high concentration to areas of low concentration to reach a state of equilibrium and not the other way around. With complete causal determinism, there exists no reason why the mechanical collisions and passing on of energy between matter cannot happen in reverse, but the 'thermodynamic asymmetry of time', based on the second law of thermodynamics means that the universe will trend towards a state of equilibrium and can only reverse this locally and temporarily (Callender, 2016). We can now understand two issues with this traditional mechanistic account of nature. First, the inability for causal determinism to give sufficient reason for mechanical interactions in nature and second the challenge this raises with respect to the thermodynamic asymmetry of time.

I will now explain the structure of the 'actual occasion' in Whitehead's process physics and the role of experience in this system. I will describe how this challenges traditional mechanistic conceptions of nature and how it addresses problems raised.

"The analysis of an actual entity is only intellectual... Each actual entity is a cell with atomic unity" (Whitehead, 1985, p.227)

Whitehead's 'actual occasion' is the most basic building block of reality. All components of the actual occasion take place simultaneously and instantaneously, but the constraints of our language require that we describe the process of an actual occasion as taking place sequentially over a period of time.

An actual event begins by feeling around in the vast scape of past events in a process Whitehead calls 'prehension' (Whitehead, 1985, pp.40-41). This prehension is a type of awareness, whereby the actual occasion 'feels' past events, known as 'immortal objects'. A subset of all historical events which are most relevant to the actual occasion will be made more concrete in a process termed 'concession' (Whitehead, 1985, p.26), which extends beyond simply feeling immortal objects to include conformal feelings, conceptual feelings, comparative feelings and intellectual feelings (Sherburne, 1981 p.40). This prehension and feeling of immortal objects gives the actual event a sense for the potential actualities that may be able to occur, meaning the past events have set constraints on the range of potentialities that can be actualised. Out of the possible actualities, the actual occasion develops a 'preference' or 'appetite' for certain possibilities. These possibilities are evaluated, and a decision is made and actualised. So far, we have seen two occasions where experience is built into Whitehead's actual occasion, and therefore the fundamental building blocks of reality, with the 'feeling' of immortal objects and the development of 'preference' for which event to actualise out of a range of possible actualities.

I will now explain how this challenges Newton's mechanistic account of nature. Whitehead terms the process from feeling potentiality to actualising the 'superject' (Whitehead, 1985, p.87). Unlike Newton's mechanistic account we do not view the superject as an object upon which prehensions happen accidentally. Instead, the superject is an active, experiencing entity, feeling the past to gain a sense of what is possible to actualise, developing a preference for what to actualise out of a range of possibilities and actualising the possibility

that is decided upon. The event that the actual occasion actualises becomes an immortal object, defining the possibilities for what events can potentially take place in the future and forming the prehensions of future events. Like causal determinism, this ensures that the future resembles the past in a sensible way and avoids the complete chaos that would ensue if actual occasions could actualise anything they pleased with no constraints. Where Newton's physics permits that time be reversed, given sufficient data, Whitehead preserves the linear direction of time by each actual occasion becoming objectively immortal, containing within it the possibilities and limitations for what future actual events can actualise. We can now understand that the prehensive influence of immortal objects would establish limitations on the events that can be actualised, preventing for instance that the event reverses itself in a way that breaks the second law of thermodynamics and the thermodynamic asymmetry of time.

The prehensive influence that immortal objects have on actualities possible in the future offers a solution to the problem of arbitrary constants in mechanistic accounts of nature. We observe a range of constants in our universe, from the speed of light to the temperature of absolute zero. These laws seem to be without cause in themselves in traditional mechanistic accounts of nature, which might just as well be otherwise, or not exist at all. Whitehead widens the influence of prehension through the introduction of the 'Nexus', which will be discussed later in this essay, and further still into 'societies', which are grand schemes of events linked together through the prehension of inherited "common characteristics" (Whitehead, 1985, p.90) that are permissive of the "self-sustenance of that society" (Whitehead,1985, p.90). Sherburne likens this to Chinese boxes, with each box containing a set of parameters and limitations of what can happen within it, that exist within a larger box that permits more rules but also must contain within itself the rules abstracted by the society contained within it (Sherburne, 1981, p.80). This reaches up to the society of pure extension. Rather than these rules being arbitrary and arising from nowhere, these constants can now be understood as the result of the prehension of a larger society, there the preference and decision of an actual occasion resulted in the creation of a new immortal object, i.e. a new society, where different and more restricted rules are imposed. These arbitrary constants or 'givens' then are specific to that 'cosmic epoch' (Whitehead, 1985, p.91), our cosmic epoch being the 'electromagnetic society'.

I will now explain how the role of experience offers a solution to the challenge presented by Laplace' demon. Where Laplace' demon has an encyclopedic knowledge of the position and velocity of all atoms in the universe, Whitehead exchanges physical atoms for actual occasions. Though we may exchange the physical atoms understood on Laplace' model for Whitehead's, Whitehead's atoms do not allow for the types of mechanistic relationships required for Laplace' demon to be able to predict the future or understand the past. Whitehead's atoms do not simply bump into each other and pass energy on in a mechanistic fashion, Whitehead's atoms feel, develop a preference and actualise one possibility out of a range of things that may have happened. The actualising is not something which happens accidentally to the actual occasion, but rather an internal process. The experience of this internal process introduces creativity into the equation, where a variety of future events could have happened. There is a range of eternal objects that could have been concressed, but a subset is brought into the superject based on preference internal to the superject, and one possible actuality is actualised by the actual occasion. Though Laplace' demon may have a snapshot of all eternal objects existing at one particular instant, it has no way of knowing what eternal objects will be concressed, what preferences exist within the actual occasion and which it will decide to actualise, meaning the demon has no way of reliably predicting what will happen in the future. The demon can only consider all possible

prehensions and the various things that they would permit to be actualised, which will be innumerable and likely infinite. The internal structure of the actual occasion is not causal either, but only described as a sequence of events affecting each other to offer an account compatible with our language. Whitehead intends for the actual occasion to be understood as happening immediately, all at once, with preference factoring into the prehension at the same moment that a decision is made and actualised. Even if we were to understand Laplace' demon as existing within an actual occasion and understanding the subatomic interactions between the various components in Whiteheads description, the use of subject-predicate language is only a vehicle for Whitehead's explanation, not what is actually happening. Because of this feeling and preference, we have a "self-creative process" (Kraus, 1998, p.36) and creative activity, where one particular event is actualised out of a range of possible actualisations (Kraus, 1998, pp.35-37). Even with complete knowledge of all events and of the components internal to the actual occasion, Laplace' demon is unable to divine the future as it cannot deal with creativity.

As a final example, I will now describe the role of experience in human experience in Whitehead's system and describe how this challenges the Cartesian mechanistic account of nature, specifically with reference to the mind-body problem. The Cartesian 'mechanical' philosophy seeks to explain natural phenomena as the result of infinitesimally small particles of matter called "corpuscles" impacting one another (Slowik, 2017). This is also the foundation for Newton's mechanical account of nature, described earlier. Descartes' intention is to reduce all phenomena, including mental phenomena, to "empirically quantifiable attributes" (Slowik, 2017). This, however, is not wholly successful, with a separation between the mind and body introduced in Descartes 'Meditations', with mind made up of 'res cogitans' which exists outside of time and space and bodies comprised of 'res extensa' that exists inside of time and space (Adriaans, 2019). This mind-body 'dualism' introduces a challenge known as the 'mind-body problem' (Robinson, 2017). The problem is that humans demonstrate both physical properties like motion, size, shape and weight, but also a set of mental properties including thought, desires and experience within one single being. The two sets of properties appear to affect each other, for example, the physical properties of a brick falling onto a person's foot might reasonably make them feel the mental object of unhappiness. Similarly, a desire to eat may cause that same person to alter their physical properties, putting their body in motion to find food. The mind-body problem asks what the relationship is between res cogitans and res extensa and how the two can impact each other if they are made up of wholly different substances. Whitehead describes this Cartesian challenge as a "disastrous separation of body and mind" (Whitehead, 1985, p.246) and offers an alternative account. The first and most fundamental difference has already been identified in this essay, as Whitehead replaces Descartes' physical 'corpuscles' as the most fundamental building blocks with 'actual occasions' which are non-physical and have experience. Whitehead overcomes the mind-body problem by creating a monistic system where everything is mind, doing away with res extensa, removing the challenge of res extensa and res cogitans impacting one another. We now understand how Whitehead challenges Cartesian dualism and next I will explain how the proto-mental feeling of the actual occasion enters into human experience.

Whitehead manages the transition from the microcosmic world of atomic actual occasions to the macrocosmic world of people, buildings and other larger entities by introducing the 'Nexus' (Sherburne, 1981, p.72). In this, groups of actual occasions clump together and if the experience of these clumped experiences are dominant over the smaller constituent actual occasions a 'transmutation' occurs (Whitehead, 1985, p.251), where this Nexus of events can be understood as objectively immortal as a single entity (Whitehead, 1985,

p.253). Intellectual consciousness exists as the product of "the gain of a power of abstraction" (Whitehead, 1985, p.254), with pre-existing proto-mental components existing through the feeling of each atomic actual occasion. This proto-mental feeling is carried through the process of transmutation, but once it reaches a certain level of "intensity arising from the force of repetition" (Whitehead, 1985, p.253) this proto-mental activity in individual actual occasions becomes the type of conscious experience held by humans.

While Whitehead's monism offers a solution to the mind-body problem, it introduces a new problem of 'emergentism' (O'Connor et al., 2015). What is described as 'feeling' within an individual actual occasion is quite different from the conscious experience of a living human. Whitehead describes life as a "bid for freedom" (Whitehead, 1985, p.104), the result of a level of "intense experience without the shackle of reiteration from the past" (Whitehead, 1985, p.105), involving the intricate relationship between various living cells and the brain. Though Whitehead does not draw a distinction between the matter that is body and that which is mind, a degree of emergence is still required to explain how we transition from proto-mental atoms to conscious and intellective mental activity which Whitehead simply does not provide. We are given no explanation for how or why proto-mental particles make a bid for freedom or how they facilitate the intellective mental activity of a human. This re-introduces similar challenges to the mind-body problem, asking us where this additional consciousness comes from, and how it then interacts with its proto-mental constituents.

"Apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness" (Whitehead, 1985, p.167)

In conclusion, 'experience is everything' is central to Whitehead's process philosophy as the fundamental atoms, actual occasion, feel and develop preferences. As the actual occasion happens instantaneously, with the various described components taking place in parallel, this feeling has relevance throughout the actual occasion. This feeling is then translated as part of the actual occasion from the microcosmic to the macrocosmic through the process of 'transmutation', retaining this feeling as a form of experience through to human consciousness. Whitehead's process philosophy challenges traditional mechanistic conceptions of nature on the most basic level by replacing physical matter with non-physical actual events and in doing so offers a compelling resolution to challenges including the thermodynamic asymmetry of time and the apparent arbitrary existence of universal constants. Whitehead's system also challenges the Cartesian mechanistic account of nature, solving the mind-body problem by proposing a monistic system where everything has experience. Whitehead's challenge of Cartesian dualism is less successful as its resolution introduces a problem of its own, emergentism, with Whitehead failing to offer a satisfactory explanation for how or why proto-mental 'actual occasions' should make a bid for freedom or how they could facilitate the intellective mental activity of a human.

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WHAT PROBLEMS DOES WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE FACE?

Is an Integrative Philosophy of Nature Possible in the Manner Whitehead Proposes in Science and the Modern World? What Problems must it Face?

Megan Tibby

In Science and the Modern World, Whitehead (1926) begins to put forth his integrative philosophy of nature. His notion on nature is a complex one that directly opposes scientific materialism, but was suited to contemporary physics at the time. This essay will first explore what his philosophy of nature is. Subsequently, I will briefly explore if it is possible in this manner he proposes. The latter portion of the essay will explore what problems it must face: In order to assess this, I will examine Rescher's discourse on the limits of integrative complexity, referring to his work in Nature and Understanding (Rescher 2000). In doing so I will outline his ideas on the limitless complexification of law and use it to directly oppose the integrative philosophy of nature whitehead proposes. Finally, I will assess the validity of both arguments, ultimately concluding that, although Whitehead's argument is strong, the manner in which his integrative philosophy of nature is proposed is not possible.

In response to the crisis of atomism, Whitehead puts forth an experiment of integration, in which we can find his integrative philosophy of nature. In order to provide some context, I will first briefly outline what the crisis of atomism is.

In Nature and the Greeks and Science and Humanism, Schrodinger (2014) discusses "the serious crisis… of atomism" (p.162) that arises when Einstein's Relativity Theory and Quantum Theory over throws the atomist ideals. As Schrodinger (2014, p.162) illustrates, "Theory of Relativity has done away with Newton's concepts of space and time… Quantum Theory, while extending atomism limitlessly has plunged it into crisis". Kuhn's (2012) discussion on the structure of scientific revolution demonstrates why this is a crisis (Hacking 1983, pp.5-8). There is no unity of science, a new theory overthrows an old theory, implying that science is composed of contradiction. Scientific history is not a gradual enrichment of knowledge, hence there is no unity of science. There is only one theory overthrowing another, thus only scientific revolution. Since the old atomist ideals have been overthrown by these new theories, a new paradigm is needed for 'high energy physics'. Furthermore, Schrodinger (2014, p.162) also states that "[T]he present crisis in modern basic science points to the necessity of revising its foundations down to the very early layers". As such, Whitehead provides a new paradigm in response to the crisis.

In Science and the Modern World (Whitehead 1926), we begin to see Whitehead's philosophy of nature emerge. He begins by acknowledging the "difference between the older and later attitudes towards science" (p.175). Whitehead rejects the Cartesian account of nature which leads to theories of a materialistic mechanistic nature. These theories meant that the objective world of science was "confined" to "spatial material with

simple location in space and time" (p.181). For Whitehead, this Cartesian dualism creates a divide that is "uneasy" (p.182), which in turn gives rise to a host of problems, such as the hard problem of consciousness and explanatory gap (Chalmers 1997), that has essentially plagued science since.

Whitehead's philosophy of nature and metaphysical system, sometimes also known as Process Philosophy, is suited to the natural sciences that developed in that period, specifically the previously mentioned Relativity Theory and Quantum Theory. We will come to see his Philosophy of Nature as integrative of the adventures of energy and ideas, the life-histories of enduring pattern. In order to demonstrate this, it is essential that I first give an account of what his metaphysical system is.

The first key claim Whitehead makes is that persistent substance does not exist. The mistake of positing persistent substances extends back as early Aristotle and his notion of substance and accidents found in Metaphysics (2016 pp.536-577). It is a mistake to argue that existence or nature must be understood as being composed of basic substances to which accidents occur. To elaborate, because these happenings or accidents do not create any change to the underlying substance, metaphysics comes to be a search for the basis of 'persistent entities' or substances and the accidental things that happen to them. But even if we can discover what basic substances in nature are, we are still left with the problem of accidental forms and how these accidental forms get into these basic substances. To posit the existence of enduring substances is what Whitehead (1979) terms "The Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness". Essentially, for Whitehead, there is no underlying material substance to which one refers to when they use the term 'matter'. What there is however, are temporal atoms or events which Whitehead terms 'actual occasions'. Nature ultimately only consists of these actual occasions. It's important to note that these events are atomic, irreducible, indivisible and are the most fundamental things, which is arguably reminiscent of the ancient Greek notion of physical science. However, Whitehead's philosophy of nature is centred around creative activity and energy, rather than just atoms and void. How does Whiteheads concept of creative "interrelated" (Desmet, Irvine 2018) activity and energy arise?

Actual occasions emerge and congress into a definite existence into a tiny and indivisible period. They must be indivisible otherwise they would fall victim to Zeno's Paradox (Huggett 2018) of infinite divisibility. The duration of a single actual occasion is a short, definite and an indivisible period. Namely, as soon as an actual occasion is concretized into actuality it then perishes. What passes from one actual occasion to another is potential form. 'The given', which are past actualised events or actual occasions, provide potential form, which ingress into present actual occasions. In turn these present actual occasions reach their moment of satisfaction, perish and become the given. Thus, then impacting the future, providing potential form that can be actualised. Alternatively, we can explain it from the reverse perspective; the present actual occasion prehends the past. This passage of form from one actual occasion to another is what composes the apparent existence of things in the world. The appearance of a persistent enduring substance is in fact an abstraction from this process containing many of these actual occasions or events. Hence the universe is for Whitehead creative activity. In summary, actual occasions or events come into being then perish just as quickly, but ingress into one another creating a chain or society of actual occasions in which we abstract to give an appearance of enduring substance. In terms of the self, we therefore are made up of an organisation of actual occasions and activity; "cognition discloses an event as being activity, organising a real togetherness of alien things"

(Whitehead, 1926 p.187). Hence, Whitehead's philosophy of Nature is an integration of complexity.

Earlier I raised the point that Whitehead's philosophy of nature is suited to the natural sciences, specifically modern physics; that being relativity theory and quantum theory. They both share the notion that there is no common cosmological clock. Furthermore, they are both concerned with being as energy rather than matter. Thus, one can argue that modern Physics could provide supporting evidence for an integrative philosophy of nature in the way Whitehead intends, therefore making it possible.

So far, I have outlined Whitehead's integrative philosophy of nature, this next section of the essay will focus on the problems it faces, focusing primarily on Rescher's (2000, p.60) discourse on the limits of "integrative complexity".

Rescher (1996, p.8) notes that for the process philosopher, like Whitehead, is one who maintains, "that what exists in nature is not just originated and sustained by process but is in fact ongoingly characterised by them". Furthermore, Rescher (2000, p.53) agrees with Whitehead on the position that nature consists of modus operandi; modes of operation. However, he takes a different approach in responding to the crisis of atomism. The position Rescher takes highlights a problem for the integrative philosophy of nature Whitehead intends. In order to demonstrate the problem an integrative philosophy of nature faces, I will first need to outline Reschers response to the crisis of atomism.

Recall the discussion earlier on Kuhn's structure of 'scientific revolutions' (Hacking 1983, pp.5-8); we know that human knowledge of nature changes historically. Consequently, Rescher (2000, p.52) asks what does this fact tell us "about the nature of physical reality"? For him, in so far as nature changes, so do its laws. "Nature is ever changing" and natural science is an ongoing process, it is not a finished project of inquiries (pp.51-52). Indicatively, examining nature at different levels of detail and sophistication new regularities and laws emerge as consequence.

The paper How Long is the Coastline of Britain (Mandelbrot, 1967), begins to illustrate Reschers claim adequately. As such, the length of Britain's coastline changes depending on the ruler you use to measure it. He is asking what is X? And X is a particular thing; thus, it would appear to have a finite answer. That is to say a single value that will correspond with the object concerned, in this case Britain's coastline. In measuring the coastline, there is a relation between the decreasing scale r, which is the ruler used to generate the quantity N, the perimeter measurement. The value of N inflates when r decreases. This is because as the ruler used gets smaller, it affords the measurement in more detail, thus increasing the perimeter. Therefore, there is no single answer to how long is the coastline of Britain. Rather, a proportion is expressed, which is termed a fractal dimension. Notably, this means that the relations between all N's have a common measure; they are integrative. Using this case, we can begin to understand Rescher's (2000, p.56) thesis: "Nature is able to [...] display different laws, categories and modes of order- when considered at different levels of detail".

However, Rescher goes further with his own demonstration. He notes how the history of physics demonstrates how ideas about nature are subject to constant change as we explore nature's structure in greater detail. That is to say, vast leaps in experimental technology entail the revelation of what Rescher calls new "parametric neighbourhoods" (p.57). In Nature and Understanding (Rescher 2000, p.57), he presents three diagrams, which represent different levels of regularity. To illustrate; we can look at an ocular microscope, a mechanical one and an electron microscope. A slide that we can examine will be given in greater detail under the mechanical microscope and at even more detail under the electron microscope, than the naked eye by virtue of the single function. Although the electron microscope affords more detail than a mechanical or ocular microscope, there is no scale or relationship between the regularities. As such, Reschers point is as follows: every parametric neighbourhood is revealed by a specific probe into nature. As there is no relationship between regularities at different levels of detail, they are irreducible to one another. We know there are different laws at different levels of detail. Ergo, there is an ever-growing limitless complexity of law, where each law is localisable and does not obtain in each domain. As such, there is no overarching law that governs them all. This limitless complexity of law is Reschers key claim. How does this pose a problem for Whitehead's integrative philosophy of nature?

As there is an ever-growing complexity of laws, it means that laws cannot be reducible to one another. As previously stated, there are simply just different laws at different levels of detail. Thus, as complexification is limitless as Rescher claims and there are no overarching laws, integration becomes irreducible and thus is ultimately doomed. Therefore, there cannot be an integrative philosophy of nature in the way that Whitehead intends.

So far, I outlined Whitehead's integrative philosophy of nature and put forth a problem it inevitably faces. This next section of the essay will be dedicated to analysing both Whitehead's and Reschers positions respectively.

Whitehead's paradigm is Heraclitan in essence, a constant flux as such. Process philosophy derives a "framework of conceptions to integrate products of modern inquiry into a coherent framework of thought linked to a metaphysical tradition reaching from Heraclitus" (Rescher 1996, pp.3-4). As such, nature; actual occasions concretise and perish. For the process philosopher, "nature is a theatre for interrelations" and "there are no self-contained activities within limited regions" (Desmet, Irvine 2018). Alternatively, we can view nature from Rescher's point of view; nature as a limitless complexification, that being appearing at different levels of complexity at level of detail and sophistication.

One may argue that in the case of Whitehead, it could be contradictory to claim that a) nature is organic and b) that it is integrative. In response to this, I would argue that in Whiteheads organism philosophy, we could view all of nature as one organism and perhaps it is the constant flux or organisation of activity that endures.

There is also an odd aspect to Reschers claim we can take into consideration; even to measure complexification, he argues over all a parametric neighbourhood in its terms. There is a possible contradiction here too.

Ultimately, both Whitehead's and Rescher's arguments both unfold to reveal different aspects of nature. It's hard to confidently claim one argument is more valid than the other. On one hand, Whitehead provides us with a new paradigm for high-energy contemporary physics. His process or organic philosophy provides a strong alternative for materialism, and is "able to account for the merit of scientific explanation" (Sudarminta, 1988). Furthermore, it is also an adequate response to the crisis of atomism. On the other hand, Reschers experiment and claims are able to be verified empirically, as demonstrated via Mandelbrot's paper on the Great British coastline and the example of the microscopes given.

Overall, Whitehead's paradigm is strong; in light of the rise of relativity and quantum theories, Whitehead successfully challenged scientific materialism, demonstrating that it is unsuited to the current scientific situation of the period. However, in the end, the integrative philosophy nature Whitehead proposes is shown not to be possible as a consequence of Rescher's experiment in complexification. Complexification is irreducible and ergo there can be no integration, there is no integrationist phenomena.

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CRITICALLY ASSESS HUMAN ENHANCEMENT TECHNOLOGY

Adam Edmundson

In his discussion on the philosophy of technology, Hans Jonas expresses some worries regarding the development of technology and its self-perpetuating nature. His concerns highlight that although philosophy will continue to bear the responsibility of ethical reflection with regards to the use of technology and its effects, it is also unprepared for the task of dealing with genetic programming (Jonas, 1978, p.41). In this essay I will specifically be discussing 'liberal' eugenics, since I believe that this kind of technology has the most potential for harming humanity, despite its proposed benefits. Other technologies may harm the planet more and threaten the existence of man, but genetic enhancement harms our quality of life. Our concept of humanity may be irreparably damaged along with some of our most central values, such as autonomy, parental love, and dignity. I will assess the effects that accepting genetic enhancement as a norm will have on our moral values, and demonstrate the similarities between liberal, and old eugenics.

'Liberal' eugenics is distinguished from 'old' eugenics based on the freedom of choice which parents will have over their child's genetic makeup, rather than the state deciding who is 'genetically fit' to reproduce. Defenders of liberal eugenics argue that it is not 'eugenic' insofar as individuals can choose freely, rather than being coerced by the state. So long as parental freedom is respected, and the autonomy of the offspring is not threatened, then liberal eugenics supposedly does not succumb to the same un-appealing implications that old eugenics did and is thus morally permissible. Firstly, I will address the notion of freedom involved, both in the future child, and the parental choice.

Parental freedom requires that parents can make their own choices with regards to the wellbeing of their children. So, with genetic enhancement technology, a liberal could argue that the capacity for a wider variety of choices promotes freedom and reduces constraints on parents with regards to the possibilities for them to promote their child's flourishing. However, a greater number of possibilities for parental control may see that the child's freedom will be diminished. Of course, we see that parents already have an obligation to control their children so that they may promote the well-being of the child. Moreover, parents also have a certain degree of choice over their child's genetics based on a natural genetic selection which constitutes mating and partner selection. So, it could be asked, why not give parents full control?

Firstly, as Sandel points out, there is a similarity between bioengineering and other forms of parental shaping and influencing of their children. But this "does not give us reason to embrace the genetic manipulation of children" (Sandel, 2009, p.61). Parents already have an ever-growing degree of control and influence over their children. Some overbearing parents already pre-emptively plan out a career for their child, whether academically or through sports, as Sandel points out when he discusses the phenomenon of 'hyper-parenting' (Sandel, 2009, p.52). In an increasingly competitive western society, which grows increasingly accustomed to having control, this kind of planning gives rise to an expectation for the child to achieve. Such pressure may already interfere with a child's ability to act independently even into adolescence. In extreme cases, this already harms the child, or adolescent's autonomy to an extent. Genetic enhancement would certainly increase this pressure, since there is already a precedent for the abuse of parental control, and the range of options for the child to pursue their own life goals may be limited depending on which traits their parents have picked out

for them. Therefore, being designed with particular ends in mind diminishes the child's autonomy.

Moreover, the expectations of the parents over someone who has been deliberately designed are liable to override the acceptance that constitutes unconditional love for their children (Sandel, 2009, pp.49-50). As it stands, virtuous parenting seems to depend on an equilibrium between accepting the child as they are, and nurturing and improving them so that they may flourish (Sandel, 2009, p.50). But when the intentional designing of children is the norm, unconditional parental love as we know it may be replaced with a social norm of parental dominion. As the investment from parents increases, and their expectations are more plausible and probabilistic, we should expect to see a further decrease in accepting parental love which may threaten our concept of unconditional parental love.

Besides the implications for restricting the autonomy and freedom of children, I see that the free decision of parents will be subject to many influences which undermine the freedom over genetic decisions which distinguishes liberal eugenics from old eugenics. Since the eugenic programmes of the west would likely be distributed by companies driven by financial incentives, the demand would come from popular opinion. Parents will now bear even more responsibility regarding the genetic make-up and well-being of their children, and so it seems only natural that individual genetic decisions would be heavily influenced by societal standards, since to have a child that could be considered inadequate by the public would open the parents up to scrutiny and blame. This seems to lead naturally to a sort of coercion from the majority.

Furthermore, as Sandel suggests, the free choice of parents would be more open to state compulsion than it first appears (Sandel, 2009, p.78). Since defenders of liberal eugenics argue that such procedures should not infringe upon the child's ability to choose their own goals and direction in life, the demand would be for enhancements that could be considered all-purpose, or generally beneficial (Sandel, 2009, pp.78-79). Given this, the state could certainly mandate these procedures under the guise of promoting health, or overall wellbeing. There is already an obligation for parents regarding matters of health and education. Thus, there is a precedent upon which genetic enhancement could be mandated by a political body; a risk which should not be ignored due to its potentially irreversible effects. This would become coercive in the way liberal geneticists seek to avoid. This undermines the argument that certain inarguably harmful vulnerabilities should be eliminated from the genome due to the potential for manipulation by a political body or free market.

Natural growth allows for a fundamentally even playing field. Whereas with the deliberate designing of a person, differences and divides are exasperated and reinforced. We have already witnessed many inequalities and domination throughout human history, and these will only be worsened under liberal eugenics, since this eliminates our fundamentally equal starting point as human beings. Inequalities already present will be exasperated once the privileged have further advantages unavailable to the poor. Regardless, the deliberate design of human beings blurs the previously untouched, and fundamental distinction between subject, and object which has implications for freedom as well as human dignity.

The distinction Habermas draws between the grown and the made is grounded on the deliberate and methodical planning of someone's being according to preferences independent of the future person. This distinction clarifies the eugenic nature of 'liberal' eugenics, since as Sandel points out, "both practises are eugenic insofar as both make children into products of deliberate design." (Sandel, 2009, p.75). Dominion over someone else's existence is enforced by those involved in the genetic programming process, and both the freedom and dignity of the future person are damaged, since in this case the future person is robbed of their right to be aware of themselves as the irreducible origin of their actions (Habermas, 2003, p.58) which constitutes our awareness of our own freedom. The origin of the programmed person's existence is at the

disposal of both the geneticist and the parent's preferences, since only particular kinds of life are affirmed. To be intentionally designed in this way is to objectify a human being who up until this point will only ever have been a subject, rather than an object of design.

To reinforce the importance of the subject/object distinction, we should briefly recall Kant's maxim, specifically the practical part, of the categorical imperative. Kant states that we should "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end." (Kant, 2008, p.29). This doesn't depend on contingent facts that vary between subjects but holds for all rational beings who are free, as Habermas agrees, only insofar as they are aware of themselves as the irreducible origin of their own actions and aspirations. We don't have to agree with deontological theory for this to support the case against liberal eugenics however, since the sentiment of this maxim expresses that we should respect the dignity of human beings as free and rational beings, and not use them like objects; since as it stands, we can all be considered an 'end-in-itself' as fundamentally equal beings.

This is an essential feature of humanity. Humanity, as consisting of subjects, who are equal members of the moral community. Equal as rational beings, and fundamentally equal in that we are all persons, or subjects. To manipulate someone's genetic code is to take this fundamental feature of humanity away. This clearly creates an un-even moral landscape, which could jeopardise our solidarity as a species. This penetrates beyond notions of freedom and autonomy and infringes on human dignity itself as a result. When somebody is a deliberately designed being, they are no longer an end in themselves, since another end, of someone else's choosing, has been set in-front of them. "The "self" of this end in itself we are obliged to respect" (Habermas, 2003, p.55) since each person's authentic existence depends on their ability to act according to their own motives. Hence why consent is of utmost importance in moral matters; which is squandered in the case of liberal eugenics where consent is impossible. Therefore, a genetically enhanced human's nature, as a being who exists freely, is corrupted. They will be endowed with an essence of someone else's choosing. Thus, they would be doomed to a kind of bad faith which is unanswerable, and the existential consequences are un-precedented.

There may be a concern that I have narrowed down the consequences of such a technology to moral values which may not be subscribed to by all. It could be argued that certain health and social benefits of enhancement technology, such as curing illness or improving one›s capacities, are being overlooked in favour of moral values which aren't valued by all. I reply that my argument aims to demonstrate that the consequences of these technologies put the values liberals defend at risk, values which allow for humanity, consisting of a collective of free and equal individuals to exist in solidarity. It would be less effective to restrict the consequential aspect of these technologies to health, since as Sandel clarifies, there is a distinction between health and enhancement that would be overlooked in this view (Sandel, 2009, p.48). If enhancement is the same as health, or promoting flourishing, then there is an obligation for parents to utilize this technology once available. This diminishes free choice of parents and opens the technology to abuse by political bodies as I have already demonstrated; and this would eliminate the distinction between the old, and liberal eugenics and undermine the argument in favour of liberal eugenics.

To conclude, I have demonstrated that the distinction between 'old' and 'liberal' eugenics is not as clear-cut as it is presented to be. The free choice of parents which is required of 'liberal' eugenics is in this case incompatible with the autonomy of the future person due to the dominion of parent over child. This has implications for disrupting the autonomy of designed persons, as well as the concept of unconditional parental love. Besides this, the choices of parents are liable to be subject to majority influence, or even government mandated genetic programmes and free markets in the worst case, if it became the norm to view enhancement

as a matter of health and wellbeing. Failing to see the difference between health and enhancement will lead to a change in social norms, where hyper-parenting and dominion may become valued over accepting and reciprocal loving relationships. Since attitudes of dominion are expressed in accepting liberal eugenics, our moral values and any potential for normative ethics will be at stake since we would no longer all be equal members of the moral landscape, because this depends on humanity being a concept that we are all included in as equal. To deliberately design a human life blurs the line between subject and object, which is to give this life instrumental value. The designed person is used merely as a means to an end over which the person has no say or control; and this is a breach on human dignity itself, which ought to be respected. The values I have focused on may not be valued by all, but values such as freedom, equality, dignity, and consent ought to be defended by any liberal. Regardless, it should be considered that we ought not to assign value to attitudes which stray us further from care and flourishing.

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WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR HUMAN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS TO LOSE HOPE?

Max Guiton

This essay will conduct a speculative investigation into naturalising hope in the physical world, as part of the human system. I will first argue that we should take the theory of autopoiesis seriously, explaining Humberto Maturana's and Francisco Varela's systems-view of living things, in the context of human autopoietic systems. Then, I will analyse the implication of this, focusing on hope as not just an emotion, but an integral part of a human autopoietic system. I will bring in Ernst Bloch's philosophy on hope, and then the implication of losing hope as put forward by Bernard Stiegler.

Fundamentally, to lose hope is to lose the drive that motivates one to continue self-creating. To lose the drive for self-creation, is not just a feeling or an emotional state but the loss of autopoiesis, and the implications of this are dire.

For centuries, there has been a prevailing view in philosophy (and science) that mind and body are separate entities – a dualist view of the mind-body problem (Robinson, 2020). Maturana and Varela's theory of cognition overcomes the problem of consciousness by placing it into the physical realm as a process. This is a systems-theory view of life and 'implies looking at a living organism in the totality of its mutual interactions' (Capra and Luisi, 2014, p.130). Thus, by reducing a complex structure to its basic systems we can understand how it works and build up through the processes to the final living organism, totally a posteriori. Before we get to cognition, let's first look at the fundamentals of autopoiesis, with a focus on the context of human systems.

Autopoiesis directly translates (from Greek) into self-creation. As outlined by the editors in the preface, a key fundamental of Maturana and Varela's living systems is that they're 'self-contained unities whose only reference is to themselves' (Maturana and Varela, 1980, p.V). The notion of autonomy is vital, and I'll return to this.

An autopoietic system is one that survives, regardless of its ever-self-changing nature (ibid., p.66). We understand that humans replace their cells at an incredible rate, across their entire body. Much like the thought experiment of a ship having all its parts replaced[1], humans are still the same human, just as the ship remains the same ship. Another metaphor would be to take the famous saying by Heraclitus that you cannot step into the same river twice (Graham, 2019) – but it's still the same river regardless of whether the same water surges downstream. Autopoiesis answers the identity problem succinctly through its nature of being a homeostatic system held together by its own organisation (Maturana and Varela, 1980, p.66). Maturana and Varela state that an autopoietic system is one that can self-maintain, due to its inner 'networking of a chemical system that continuously reproduces itself within a boundary of its own making' (Capra and Luisi, 2014, p.129). It is a system which constantly 'regenerates' (Maturana and Varela, 1980, p.79). And the beauty of this is that it allows for the system to change, adapt and modify itself to become a better autopoietic system. This explains the existence of evolution – it's a slow process that takes gradual change – thus not losing identity. The better a living system adapts to its environment, the higher the chances of survival and continued self-creation. This is a great example of why the autopoiesis theory is good; it helps us understand other processes better. An

autopoietic system must ensure self-maintenance and protect itself from any perturbation that could lead to the breakdown of organisation, that would mean a loss of identity.

Its phenomenology and how a living system interacts with its environment also raises interesting points. The cognition of autopoietic systems is a particularly fascinating area for Maturana and Varela. A living system's phenomenology is not constitutive from 'notions arising in the domain of description' (ibid., p.79), because its phenomenology arises from its own organisation and is a circular "closed-system". The domain of description being the domain in which we identify the measurable characteristics of objects. This discussion is interesting, because as Capra further expands, it makes for a system which is self-sufficient in its identity and reproduction, but one which requires energy and nutrients from its environment (2014, pp.133-4). Furthermore, the system 'creates its own environment', through a cognitive process, 'and the environment permits the actualisation of the organism' (ibid.). An important thing to clarify here is that neither the system nor environment change each other, but simply act as 'triggers' (ibid., p.135) on each other. I think this is another useful aspect of the theory, because it demonstrates our relationship to nature. One which must be understood in order to protect it.

This returns us to what fascinated Maturana and Varela in the first place: autonomy, which is 'an essential feature of living systems' (Maturana and Varela, 1980, p.73). Capra develops this area and highlights how Maturana states 'the behaviour of a living organism is determined' (2014, p.136), but by its own organisation, rather than its environment (or a higher being/purpose[2]). Thus, the behaviour of autopoietic systems is 'both determined and free' (ibid.).

Once more addressing the cognition in autopoietic systems, I want to reinforce the point that cognition and mind are not part of a separate domain from the physical organism. Capra depicts a Venn diagram (Figure 1) that shows life as a tripartite system of the: environment, autopoietic system and cognition. He's making the point that these can't be considered independent as 'life is the synergy of the three domains' (2014, p.142). This further develops the point that mind is not an abstract construct, which Maturana and Varela demonstrate in their autopoietic system. They say that cognition is fundamental in the 'self-generation and self-perpetuation of living networks' (ibid., p.254). Capra aptly summarises this[3] saying that 'cognition is the very process of life' (ibid.). Fundamentally, I agree with this development, and the tripartite system visually helps represent this to us. The autopoietic system is itself just one aspect of life and we must remember that as the fundamental view of this systems-theory, our consciousness exists as a biological set of processes. You cannot separate one from the other. I like this theory because of how humbling it is – it grounds us in our reality.



*Figure SEQ Figure * ARABIC 1: Venn Diagram (Capra and Luisi, 2014, p. 142)*

The last point that I want to draw out from autopoiesis is what, to me, is the most important feature: the values that an autopoietic system must hold. As we have established, an autopoietic system is autonomous, but bound by its own organisation, interacting with its environment through triggers; one which is circular, and self-creating; however, it requires energy from that environment. An autopoietic system must ensure that it does not lose its organisation through any perturbations, and that any changes must be in the best interest of self-maintenance (Maturana and Varela, 1980, p.87). This shows that it must hold values and decide what is good/bad for the system to remain autopoietic as opposed to allopoietic[4]. Again, as we outlined that cognition is a physical set of processes, part of life, these values are too basic biological features. Which brings me to hope.

As Ernst Bloch puts it, in The Principle of Hope, hope is an emotion unlike all the others. He states how – as we have seen in Maturana and Varela's system theory – hope is a 'purely cognitive process' (Bloch, 1995, p.112). This means Bloch's philosophy is uniquely pertinent to the idea of autopoiesis and this essay. There is a direct parallel in Bloch's view of hope (in particular) as a naturalised emotion – which is what I am trying to demonstrate in this essay. As it is merely a set of chemical processes, it can be attributed to other biological aspects (like the levels of serotonin for example, which I will return to), and ultimately is vital in the autopoietic process of self-creation.

Bloch says that we must overcome the 'static concept of being' for the 'real dimension of hope to open' (1995, p.18). It ties to Capra's Venn diagram well, showing that our traditional Cartesian division of mind and body is no longer sufficient. Furthermore, he speaks of a 'propensity towards something [...] and this intended something means fulfilment of the intending' (ibid.). This to me shows the value drives which a self-creating system pursues in maintaining its autopoiesis. It's remarkably similar to the systems theory put forward by our main scholars. Hope is by nature a 'militant emotion' (ibid.) that, interestingly, 'drowns anxiety' (ibid.). So, what would it mean for an autopoietic system to lose hope?

I shall now draw on the philosophy of Bernard Stiegler, from his book The Age of Disruption (2019), to help me demonstrate what it means to lose hope. Early on, Stiegler refers to an imminent 'social explosion' (2019, §3) because of the exploitation through technology on human freedoms. The technological advances are the focus in this book, because Stiegler says that our digital transformation has radicalised society in a way never seen before (2019, §4). The main problem now being the 'data economy' (ibid.) that exists as a multi billion-pound industry[5], harvesting our online (and in some cases offline) footprints. We've entered an age where our thoughts/desires/emotions have been monetised. It's understandable to see the fear in Stiegler's writing for these unprecedented developments. Fundamentally, we are witnessing a 'colossal social disintegration' that is resulting in an 'automatic nihilism' (ibid.). This is anything but autopoietic. However, I do not want to focus on how societies can be seen as autopoietic systems – though that is something discussed by Capra (2014), and I do agree. The impact of this social breakdown affects all the individuals in society, not just the collective.

As Stiegler develops in section 5, technology (mainly social media) is not just suggesting, but actually driving future actions. Stiegler refers to this as 'automatic protentions' (2019), referencing Husserlian phenomenology. In other words, algorithms have taken over all our propensities for future desires. To summarise, Stiegler says that this new behemoth (technology) is 'depriving [us] of our own existence by preceding [our] will' and 'emptying [us] of meaning' (ibid.). Now we can understand why Stiegler is calling this nihilistic. This is the destruction of autopoiesis[6].

Bringing this back to hope, Stiegler states how a loss of the ability to express our will (on which our very existence is based) results in the loss of reason for living and thus turning completely mad (ibid.). He explains how this "madness" leads to suicide and barbaric actions. This demonstrates the loss of self-maintenance that an autopoietic system can experience – the resulting madness becomes self-destructive. There is much science that shows depleting levels of serotonin correlate directly to low mood (McIntosh, 2020), and the same is true of dopamine correlating to our motivation drives. These understandings are based on chemical processes and are further reinforced in an autopoietic systems-view, which shows complex structures as made up of smaller processes. I think the notion of hope therefore has a direct correlation to these chemicals and thus "moods" which in turn reflect our motive drives. And ultimately, if these are lost, then one loses the motivation to continue being autopoietic.

Stiegler rounds this off by asserting that the madness is not isolated to random individuals but is infecting 'entire groups and countries' (ibid.). Moreover, it is now beginning to affect entire generations. Here, Stiegler quotes a young man named Florian, who speaks of how his generation have lost all hope. They have lost the drive and motivation for the future, because the outlook is too depressing. The important connection I want to make here is that this loss of hope and drive is turning the young and optimistic mad; and that madness brings with it a complete collapse of autopoiesis. Stiegler is describing an almost anti-poiesis, which threatens to consume itself in a frenzy descent into madness. So, what would it mean for an entire generation to stop being autopoietic? That would be the beginning of the end of the human race...

To conclude, there is much speculation in this area of autopoiesis and hope. I have tried to demonstrate that autopoiesis is not some crazy idea, but actually one which grounds our understanding of life. Using Capra's Venn diagram, we can see how life is made up of the autopoietic system, cognition and our environment. By understanding humans as autopoietic systems we can understand better how they work, especially regarding the mind and consciousness. This enables us to naturalise things like hope and correlate them to traditional chemical understandings around serotonin for example (by demonstrating that hope is just another physical process in an autopoietic system).

The extent to which an autopoietic system can lose all hope and thus its autopoiesis is unknown. It may be that this process can be halted or even reversed – at least one would hope that's the case. However, as Stiegler puts forward, we are in new territory that is changing generations at levels unseen before. So, to avoid a fall into madness we utilise the view of autopoiesis in helping us identify the processes of hope and restore this in younger generations, through any means possible.

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NOTES

[1] It goes like this: take a ship, and over the period of say a month it has all of its parts – from its engine to its hull – replaced like-for-like. After these replacements, you understand that not one single part of the ship remains from prior to the repairs, but nonetheless it still remains the same ship – or does it? That is the question posed by the thought experiment. Regardless, I concur that it does retain that same identity, just like a human retains their same identity even though their cells replace throughout their entire body over X number of weeks/months.

[2] Maturana and Varela try hard to distance themselves from a form of teleology, as they respect self-organisation is an easy route to slip into of a form of "vitalism". Vitalism being the view which posits that a living thing requires a mysterious life force as its driving purpose. However, I don't think they make this error.

[3] Building from Maturana's quote in the introduction to Autopoiesis and Cognition: 'living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process of cognition' (1980, p.13).

[4] The opposite of an autopoietic system is an allopoietic one. That is a system which is not self-creating, or autonomous. It produces something 'different from themselves' (Thompson, 2007, p.98). One whose identity relies on the observer (Maturana and Varela, 1980, pp.80-1). Though I won't explicitly be exploring this in my essay.

[5] The industry is currently worth around $50 billion and forecast to double over the next decade (Columbus, 2018).

[6] An argument could be made that the technology – algorithms and AI – are in fact succeeding at being autopoietic systems, though I do not have the time to investigate this line of enquiry.

THE PROBLEM WITH THE SCIENTIFIC WORLDVIEW

Putnam's account of naturalism has two elements: the avoidance of supernaturalism and the adherence to 'scientific method'. What are the problems such naturalisms encounter?

Evan Botwood

I start this essay with a discussion on the definition of naturalism, as this itself is a problem that naturalisms encounter. This reveals that to do justice to the topic this essay consists of the presentation of common problems that naturalisms encounter, which act as a roadmap of what a rigorous naturalism will need to avoid, thereby acting to clear up its vagueness. I use the phrase 'scientistic naturalism' to refer to the main subject of my essay. I define scientistic naturalism with Boyd et al. and so with Putnam, (2012a, p.110) (and this essay's question); "The view that all phenomena are subject to natural laws, and/or the methods of the natural sciences are applicable in every area of inquiry" (Boyd et al, 1991, p.778). This essay is split into three problems. The first two problems primarily take two of Putnam's (2012a, 2012b) writings as their source, whereas the third takes Kuhn's (1996). The first is the problem of vagueness. The second problem is the failure of scientistic naturalism to account for all entities. This problem is split into two parts. In the first part, I argue that scientistic naturalism fails to account for physical everyday objects. I argue in the second part that scientistic naturalism fails to account for the epistemic values of science and itself, thereby it is self-contradictory. My third problem is that the way science itself functions doesn't allow for scientistic naturalism. This means there is no unity to the manifold scientistic naturalisms, nor can scientific methods cover every area of inquiry. My final conclusion is that any rigorous naturalism must account for all entities in the world, and realise a plurality of scientific methods (and methods outside science). To do so, a new naturalism requires philosophic work, not exclusive adherence to the scientific method.

The definitions above entail that all entities are caused by natural laws and that no entity exists that isn't. It also entails all entities that exist are reducible to scientific concepts, which can be described under scientific theory. Thus, anything that can't be described by the methods of scientific enquiry doesn't exist. For example, the physicist can't study magical powers, thus they don't exist. However, these definitions reveal the first problem of scientistic naturalism; its definitions are either absent or vague. This is noted by Putnam (2012a, pp. 110-111). What does 'phenomena' exactly refer to? Is it enough to say that nothing can violate natural laws? Which methods are applicable where? Can they cover all areas of inquiry? This vagueness is also noted by other commentators (Caro and Macarthur, 2008, pp. 2-3) (Papineau, 2020). The problem is that these questions must have an answer, and there must be clarity behind the viewpoint, though it is rarely given (as Putnam (2012a, p.110) states). This is not because of poor training or experience, but rather what Putnam (2012a, p.110) describes as Stalinism. This means an irrational commitment to naturalism with the belief that there is no potential of it being incorrect. This is because of a "horror of the normative" (Putnam, 2012a, p.125), the view that allowing anything to not be reduced to the physical world (as described by science) is allowing some supernatural 'occult' to exist. This vagueness is a clear problem to scientistic naturalism, as it raises many problems and demonstrates its lack of philosophical vigour.

Nevertheless, I will use these definitions as they are useful in demonstrating a range of problems that 'such naturalisms' encounter. To define even further at the beginning would not be to present the problems that

scientistic naturalism encounters on the whole, but merely one particular strand of it. Additionally, it would not be answering the question posed, namely the problems such naturalisms (plural) encounter. To do justice to the topic then, (as stated earlier) this essay will consist of the presentation of common problems that such naturalisms encounter, which will act as a roadmap of what a rigorous naturalism will need to avoid, and act to clear up its vagueness. I have presented the first problem that scientistic naturalism encounters, namely that it is vague, and will now go onto a second problem.

The second problem encountered with scientistic naturalism is the failure to account for all entities (through scientific reductionism or otherwise), that is, a complete ontology. This will be in two parts. The first is how scientistic naturalism fails to account for physical everyday objects. The second, how it fails to account for the epistemic values of science and itself, therefore it is self-contradictory. How can we account for the existence of physical non-scientific phenomena, such as sandwiches, books and poetry? This is done by demonstrating that all entities can ultimately be reduced down to scientific concepts. I will give a common naturalist reductionist account (the 'argument from composition'), then counter it, both reading from Putnam (2012a). Everything used to be just fields and particles, and everything now present came to be because of the physical processes described in the natural sciences. Therefore, entities are mereological sums of other physical objects, in addition to nothing. That is to say that every whole entity is made up from many physical parts, and that's all it fundamentally is. Everything that appears to be non-physical (poetry, value judgments, mathematical statements, ethics) can be shown to be reduced down to the physical level, or shown to be an excess (Putnam, 2012a, pp. 119-120). Ultimately, what is real is what science describes. I have given a common scientific reductionist view, which I will now counter.

Putnam (2012a, pp. 120-123) counters this by arguing that it is not true that things are only mereological sums of physical objects. He uses the case of personal identity to do so. Am I the sum of atoms? In one way, yes I am because I do consist materially of connected atoms. Nevertheless, this question means more than this, namely, it is a statement of logical identity; I am identical with my atoms. However, if this is true, then I must have existed for a thousand years because my atoms have. Eating is additionally problematic because it entails that if I had eaten differently, I would be a different person. To say that I am identical with the atoms at a particular time solves my immortality, but not the problem of eating. This is because counterfactuals (statements that are contrary to the current state of affairs i.e. if X happened, then Y would have happened) depend on rigid identity (Putnam, 2012a, pp. 120-123). It would still be true that these other atoms would have made me another person. Therefore, our everyday objects (books, dogs) can't be accounted for under this reductionist view, as there remain questions of the unity and persistence of objects. This remains true for whichever scientific part, such as atoms, energy fields, and chemicals, forms the mereological whole. This is a significant problem for scientistic naturalism, as these everyday objects are self-evident and require explanation, even if they are shown to be an illusion, or otherwise not real. I have demonstrated the first part of my second problem of scientistic naturalism, which is the failure of scientific reductionism to account for all the physical everyday objects that exist in the world.

The second part of my second problem (the failure of scientistic naturalism to account for all entities) is that scientistic naturalism can not account for the epistemic values of science, and itself, therefore it is self-contradictory. Science's methods are 'applicable in every area of inquiry', and thus must be able to account for themselves. However, the methods of natural sciences can't be applied to themselves, because its output is not values, but facts and associated theories concerning natural phenomena. Therefore, values in science must be avoided for scientistic naturalism to be self-consistent, under its own rules. This issue has been attempted to be circumvented in many ways, including solely using deductive logic, or taking psychology to serve this function (Putnam, 2012b, p.48). However, Putnam states they are fantasy. This is because he argues that

"knowledge of facts presupposes knowledge of values" (Putnam, 2012b, p.47). That is, to do science in the first place, one must have already assumed a set of values. Values can't simply be reduced down or avoided. When the scientific methods are performed, there have to be value judgments about what is coherent, meaning we have to judge which observations or memories to trust, which theory is most valuable, and which evidence is more relevant. Scientific fact isn't presented to us immediately as fact, and so requires our judgement. It can't be said that facts are solely objective and values are solely subjective, due to how entangled they are, even within the fact-creating disciplines of the natural sciences (Putnam, 2012b, p.48). Natural sciences methods, therefore, could never discover their own values as it's operation depends on these same value-judgements. Therefore, scientistic naturalism is self-contradictory, as it can't account for the existence of itself (as it is a system of value that values the methods of science most highly), nor the scientific disciplines it values. I have shown that scientistic naturalism is self-contradictory by arguing how it cannot account for its own, or sciences, values. Both parts of my second problem are now complete. I have shown that scientistic naturalism fails to account for all entities, which leads to a lack of everyday objects, and self-contradiction. A rigorous naturalism must avoid these problems that I have described it will encounter.

My third problem is that the way science itself functions doesn't allow for scientistic naturalism. My end conclusions here are that there is no unity of the sciences, therefore no unity to scientistic naturalism (it is manifold), nor its natures (or ontology). Secondly, the methods of science cannot be said to cover every area of enquiry, not even their future subject. I will reconstruct Kuhn's explanation of how science functions throughout history, then argue for why this is a problem for scientistic naturalism. I will add the section numeral with my Kuhn citations, for the readers benefit. Kuhn (1996) argues that science is inherently within history, and hence, changes through different incommensurable paradigms. For Kuhn, there are four historical stages of science. Firstly, there is 'normal science' which is puzzle-solving research, based upon previous scientific achievement which serves as its foundation (Kuhn, 1996, II p.10, IV pp. 35-37). This is characterised by a 'paradigm', which is the term for this foundation of concepts, rules, and as yet unsolved problems. Secondly, comes the crisis, where anomalies in the normal science build-up to the point where they cannot be solved within the current paradigm (Kuhn, 1996, VII-VIII). Crises start as a blurring of a paradigm, and looser rules, but ends either with normal science handling the crisis, a setting aside of the problems (due to their resistance to new approaches), or a new paradigm emerging and disputes occur over its acceptance (Kuhn, 1996, VIII p.84). The acceptance of this new theory is a revolution, that is, a radical change of world view (Kuhn, 1996, X pp. 111-112). It is not a cumulative process, or an extension of the previous paradigm, but rather a whole new reconstruction of the fundamentals of the field, changing its methods, applications, goals and solutions (Kuhn, 1996, VII pp. 84-85). After this, it returns to 'normal science', with a whole new set of problems to solve till the next crisis occurs. I have reconstructed Kuhn's argument, which is the ground for my subsequent explanation of why Kuhn's argument is a problem for scientistic naturalism.

Kuhn's argument reveals two important points, which imply problems that naturalisms encounter. The first is that the methods of science are manifold and incommensurable. The second is that they can radically change. I argue here that given there are many sciences, there are many scientistic naturalisms. The first point entails that there are a great variety of scientific methodologies, which don't fit neatly together. Indeed, they each have their own paradigms, with their own concepts and definitions. As such, to try and fit multiple paradigms into one unity is a fruitless endeavour. Kuhn's (1996, p.50) example of this is asking a physicist and a chemist whether a single atom of helium was a molecule. To the chemist, it certainly was, but for the physicist it was not. Each was viewing it through their paradigm. The problem is this: Which scientific method does scientistic naturalism refer to? If it refers to all of them, then presumably we could apply one method to a different area of study e.g. chemistry to the work of the physicist. However, we have seen this to be false given the

incommensurability. Manifold scientific methods imply manifold scientistic naturalisms. This is a major problem for scientistic naturalisms, as they imply many other equally valid, but paradigmatically different, versions of themselves. Taking into account that they also can radically change, not only is there manifold scientistic naturalisms that are incommensurable to each other, but even a particular one will become incommensurable to itself in time. I will now continue and end this line of thought by demonstrating how it contradicts both of the definitions above.

These conclusions I have made from Kuhn (1996) contradict scientistic naturalism definitions, thereby constituting problems for it. I argue that the above point concerning manifold scientistic naturalisms equally applies to the first definition. Secondly, I argue the methods of science can't cover every area of inquiry, not even their future subject. Firstly, the point concerning manifold scientistic naturalism equally applies to the definition 'All phenomena are subject to natural laws'. This definition can mean many things, as the relevant scientific phenomena and the natural laws are dependent on whichever paradigm one resides in. That is, the laws and primary concepts of physics differ from those of chemistry, which differ from those of geology. Additionally, the breaking of these natural laws is a required element of science. Therefore, there are also manifold natures (or ontologies) in the sense that there are several different sets of phenomena, subject to several corresponding natural laws. Secondly, the methods of the natural sciences are shown to be not applicable in 'every area of enquiry'. Given that each method is highly specialised, it cannot be applied outside of its area, therefore scientific methods cannot cover every area of enquiry; We have already seen the failure of scientific reduction. As Putnam (2012a, p.111) notes, could you perform natural science to interpret a text? Furthermore (given statement two, that they radically change) the current methods of natural science aren't even applicable to their own subject in future, let alone every area of enquiry. This is a substantial problem to scientistic naturalism, because it goes directly against its adherence to the scientific method, and necessitates a further method or field is required (philosophical work). As Putnam (2012b, p.47) states "Both physics and metaphysics flourish most when they interact and interpenetrate". I have demonstrated that two crucial points from Kuhn's argument reveal problems within scientistic naturalism. These are first that there are many scientific methods, so many scientistic naturalisms (it is manifold). Secondly, the methods of science cannot be said to cover every area of enquiry, not even their future subject.

This essay has presented three problems that scientistic naturalism encounters. My first problem showed that it is a vague concept. The second demonstrated that it can fail to account for all entities. Firstly, by failing to account for physical everyday objects. To argue this, I presented a scientistic reductionist account, then countered it by using Putnam's argument from personal identity. Secondly, it fails to account for sciences epistemic values, and its own values. To demonstrate this, I argued that knowledge of facts presupposes knowledge of values. My third problem was the way science itself functions doesn't allow for scientistic naturalism, leading to self-contradiction. The first sub-problem was that there is no unity to the sciences, therefore no unity to scientistic naturalism. The second was that the sciences can't cover all areas of inquiry, not even their own future. This was achieved by reconstructing Kuhn's structure of scientific revolutions, explaining two key points it presents, and applying it to the definitions. My final conclusion is that any rigorous naturalism must account for all entities in the world, (everyday objects, values, and otherwise) and realise a plurality of scientific methods (and methods outside science). To do so, a new naturalism requires philosophic work, not exclusive adherence to the scientific method.

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INTERSECTIONALITY

ISSUES OF VISIBILITY IN INTERSECTIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

An initial enquiry into the relationship between Intersectionality and Consciousness.

Kimberly Rogers

In this essay I will be explaining what intersectionality is, its key relevance to the feminist movement; describing both the benefits and limitations of its functionality in this regard. This is part of a wider relational exploration I am looking to make between intersectionality as a framework, and consciousness. The scope of this relation is both broad and complex, and as a result I will be focusing this paper on a short initial enquiry seeking to merely highlight this relation as both a relevant and important commentary; affecting both feminism and movements which operate within sex, race, and class intersects. I am interested in noting how unconsciousness potentially steers intersectionality into invisibility and how this is problematic specifically for issues relating to women's solidarity and other potential unifying principles. I will define what I am referring to by consciousness using a psychoanalytic understanding, in order to demonstrate its influence before concluding with a summary of my key findings.

Intersectionality, to summarize with intentional simplicity at this point; is a framework which enables us to understand with greater depth the nature of other individuals' oppressions and privileges. It began to emerge through the work of Deborah King, who recognized that mainstream feminist theories did not reflect minorities adequately and that as a result political actions would not alleviate oppressions for all women. King (1988) argued that the reason for this partial picture was down to how issues of race, sex and class (the "triple jeopardies") had traditionally been too simplistically comprehended as separate systems of control. She claimed that the way in which they actually interacted with one another was reflective of multiple processes at play and also the mutuality of the relationships they have with one another: "The modifier "multiple" refers not only to several, simultaneous oppressions but to the multiplicative relationships among them as well" (King, 1988, p.47). Kings re-clarification of 'multiple jeopardies' and understanding them as an interactive rather than a static single-issue model, would ensure greater visibility of black women and the unique nature of their multiple oppressions. "Unable to grasp the importance of Black women's intersectional experiences, not only courts, but feminist and civil rights thinkers as well, have treated Black women in ways that deny both the unique compoundedness of their situation and the centrality of their experiences to the larger classes of women or Blacks" (Crenshaw,1989, p.327). Crenshaw continued to successfully highlight the ways in which our understanding, and conceptually limiting use of single axes of discrimination rendered black women, their oppressions, needs and rights; invisible. Her 1989 paper listed multiple examples of times that anti-discrimination law failed to contextualize, comprehend, or uphold the uniqueness of black women's discriminations. Solidifying the term intersectionality as that which best represents the multifaceted intersections of, and the relations between; multiple oppressions: "This can be seen both in the ways they act as structural forces and are applied to individuals" (Garry, 2011, p.829).

In addition to law courts, white feminists who present their experience as universal even though it's not, represent another example of how black women's oppressions are omitted from collective consciousness. The groups we are either members of, or excluded from, where we grow up, our profession and the expectations we experience in life, all affect how our identities and consciousness are shaped, and these can also create conflicts and inter-dimensions. A woman doesn't just consist of one dimension, but of many different dimensions of self. Social norms, therefore, also contribute to our inter-dimensions and it is the framework of intersectionality which allows us to trace the effect of these different kinds of experiences with particular

emphasis on oppression and privilege. When we move the argument into the realm of identity, we also highlight one of the biggest issues with intersectionality; the problem of fragmentation in the feminist movement in relation to solidarity. This is because solidarity is understood as sacrifice for others; taking risks or political action for those we feel an emotional bond with. Solidarity therefore involves trust and care, which means that the quality of the solidarity changes depending on the group. Women with shared experiences of oppression, obstacles and perspectives on the world identify with one another and therefore feel solidarity. However, if we do not share some experiences or perspective, we can potentially conflict on issues. Therein lies the fundamental critique of intersectionality; in that it serves to amplify the differences in experience rather than emphasize shared ones, driving women into separate identities and selves and ultimately creating conflict within the movement. However, we cannot theorize away the existence of oppression and privilege and in that sense, we cannot theorize away intersectionality. Additional critiques of intersectionality are based on the fact that rather than provide a concrete set methodology it merely lays out a fluid, and at times, inconsistent framework that due to its metaphorical nature, can often be interpreted in multiple, and therefore, confusing terms: ". . .by itself, intersectionality provides neither any structural analyses of oppressions and privileges nor any particular analysis of anyone's complex identity or experiences. Instead it points out what kinds of analyses might be useful, namely, ones that consider mutually constructed or intermeshed axes of oppression or facets of identities" (Garry, 2011, p.830). Fundamentally, intersectionality recognizes the complexities inherent in the race, class, sex conversation and its framework apply to everyone; not just the oppressed but also the privileged, recognizing the two binaries as that which constitute one another. As a result, it promotes self-knowledge and a lean towards moral self-improvement as it encourages us to question and challenge domination that we find in groups: "If women from many different groups share a gender, we must constantly be vigilant to keep dominant (for our purposes, white or Western) women de-centered, off center stage - historically, in the present, and in the future. Otherwise we cannot construct pluralist, inclusive feminist theory" (Garry, 2011, p.843).

At this point in the paper we have gathered an in-depth understanding of Intersectionality, its benefits and its limitations. We can see its essential nature can be elusive, as it sign-posts us to places and spaces of oppression and privilege which would otherwise remain obscured from our individual perspective. It is the operational nature of its 'slipperiness' (Garry, 2011, p.826) which I see as directly impacting its collective visibility to us as a vital framework, and subsequently reveals itself to be related to consciousness. Consciousness is a broad catch-all term, for my purposes here I am using the thinking from feminist psychoanalysis as "it discloses the ways in which our sense of self, and our political loyalties and attachments, are influenced by unconscious drives and ordered by symbolic structures that are beyond the purview of individual agency" (Zakin, 2011). Intersectionality is inviting us to shift perspective from the one we embody to that of an 'other'. Its successful visibility relies on how well we are able to make that shift, which in turn relies upon aspects of self and others obscured in our own unconscious and, aspects of self and others apprehended through our own consciousness. This realm, therefore, of our own unique unconsciousness; is the place of which we unknowingly keep aspects of ourselves and others hidden. It is also the realm where certain facets of knowledge; including responses and reactions, that have arisen from within the intersects of sex, class, race and other systems of control, have been repressed to. How we conceptualize ourselves, and others, based on our own internal forces, ambivalences and conflicts, embodied both consciously and unconsciously by multiple dimensions of ourselves; influence the key issues of solidarity and fragmentation we find in the intersectionality argument. These issues only arise when we view intersectionality through the cloak of invisibility that represents a lack of conscious awareness: "Between the "I" and the "me" or between the unconscious and the conscious in the individual personality, a tense relationship exists comparable to the one between two unequal partners in dialogue. Without being articulated, unconscious impulses accompany all

of our conscious conduct in life by effectively commentating, as it were, current modes of behavior in the form of feelings of approval or disapproval" (Honneth, 2007, p.187).

The intersects of intersectionality "point to the ways in which oppressions intermesh with each other or are used to constitute each other" (Garry, 2011, p.829). With what we have drawn from psychoanalysis, we can see that this process of constituting intersections is actually done both consciously and unconsciously. Returning to Crenshaw's original analogy for intersectionality, that of busy traffic: "coming and going in all four directions. Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all of them. Similarly, if a Black woman is harmed because she is in the intersection, her injury could result from sex discrimination or race discrimination [or both]" (Crenshaw, 1989, p.149). If we were to bring consciousness into this analogy we might consider that the drivers of the vehicles are in different states of drowsy lucidness; oblivious to their shared intersubjectivity with the other vehicles and pedestrians external to them, but also oblivious to their own hidden internal prejudices and personal processes of discrimination which are co-driving the vehicle forward. "Unconscious mental states are unconscious precisely in that we lack the relevant higher-order states about them. Their being unconscious consists in the fact that we are not reflexively and directly aware of being in them" (Van Gulick, 2018). This for me, more accurately reflects the real-life engagement with the framework because of its relationship to consciousness. This is also fundamentally why intersectionality appears to be fluid and inconsistent, it is mirroring the fluid inconsistency of our own unconscious internal drives, changing desires and aversions, and other fragmented forces which wobble the framework that we are all co-creating, constituting, and enforcing through the collective unconscious. Zakin summaries as such, stating that "Politically, psychoanalysis offers a depiction of the forces that impel us to organize, disorganize, and reorganize the bonds that hold us together. By offering insight into the formation of subjectivity and the animating fantasies of social life, psychoanalysis thus also facilitates feminist analysis of the obdurate elements of patriarchal social relations, including the symbolic bonds and internal forces that undergird identity and attach sexed subjects to relations of dominance and subordination" (2011).

At this point in the paper I shall start to move towards a conclusion, one in which I seek a solution focus for, as if it were possible to concretize intersectionality and shift it away from its slipperiness and wobbliness. Exploring the realms of the unconscious in relation to issues of autonomy Honneth states that ". . the better subjects learn to become familiar with a multitude of unused possibilities for identity in themselves, the more aware they will become of the concrete predicaments and neediness which other subjects have to struggle with in their lives" (2007). Although our line of inquiry is not autonomy led, we can see the parallel that in becoming conscious of all our own unconscious inter-dimensions and aspects of self, we have the potential to evolve the nature of womxn's solidarity. As with greater consciousness we become more visible to ourselves, we recognize the role we have played in constituting other women's oppressions and/or privileges, as they too become more visible to us. This is to truly seek the perspective of the other her, her discriminations, her needs and rights as understood as an extension of our own, in solidarity and above all unconscious fragmentation. Self-enquiry or turning inwards to oneself is therefore a big part of the answer if we are to better consciously see the 'other her' and to apprehend intersectionality in its uncompromising truth.

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